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ABSTRACT 
Lisa Casanova 
Survival and Transmission of Coronaviruses in the Healthcare Environment 
(Under the direction of Dr. Mark Sobsey) 
 
The need for a comprehensive understanding of the routes by which viruses can spread 
in healthcare environments and the measures needed to prevent transmission has taken on 
particular urgency since the advent of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). First 
emerging in 2003, this newly discovered coronavirus infection spread through 26 
countries, with over 8000 cases and 700 deaths. One of the striking features of the SARS 
outbreak was its spread in healthcare facilities, resulting in transmission to patients, 
visitors, and healthcare workers (HCWs). Evidence suggests that in addition to droplets 
and aerosols, environmental surfaces, including protective equipment worn by healthcare 
workers, may serve as vehicles for transmission of SARS-CoV in the healthcare 
environment. However, there are significant gaps in our knowledge of how coronaviruses 
survive on inanimate surfaces and objects, including personal protective equipment (PPE) 
items, found in healthcare environments. To fill these crucial knowledge gaps, this 
research was undertaken to better understand risks of viral contamination during PPE 
removal and the effects of temperature and humidity on the survival of coronaviruses on 
surfaces found in healthcare environments. These studies showed that currently 
recommended methods for removal of healthcare PPE are insufficient to protect HCWs 
from viral contamination during PPE removal, and that potential alternative methods for 
PPE removal should be developed and validated. Viral survival studies using human and 
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animal coronaviruses as potential surrogates for SARS coronavirus show that if deposited 
in high numbers, coronaviruses dried onto surfaces may survive for days at temperatures 
and humidity levels found in healthcare environments. These viruses may also survive on 
materials used to make PPE long enough to pose a transmission risk. These findings 
suggest other members of the coronavirus family could serve as conservative surrogates 
for modeling the risk of indirect personal contact and environmental transmission of 
SARS by healthcare surfaces and PPE items, and can be used in studies to determine 
ways to interrupt this route of exposure and reduce the risk of disease transmission. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Background 
Viruses have long been recognized as a source of nosocomial infections, including 
coronaviruses, influenza, mumps, measles, respiratory syncytial virus, varicella, rubella, 
adenoviruses, and noroviruses, with both humans and the physical environment in 
healthcare facilities playing a role in the spread of these viruses and the illnesses they 
cause (Sepkowitz, 1996; Sattar, 2004). The need for a comprehensive understanding of 
the routes by which viruses can spread in healthcare environments and the measures 
needed to prevent transmission has taken on particular urgency since the advent of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). First emerging in 2003, the outbreak of this 
previously unknown atypical viral pneumonia become emblematic of infectious disease 
in the age of global travel, spreading from person to person, through cities, between 
countries, and across continents with the movements of human beings. When it was 
realized that an outbreak had begun, the race was on to find the etiologic agent. The 
finish line was first crossed by two groups almost simultaneously, identifying the 
causative agent of SARS as a novel member of the coronavirus family (Drosten et al., 
2003; Ksiazek et al., 2003 Rota et al.  2003).  The virus was not only unknown up to that 
point, but unrelated to any of the currently known human or animal coronaviruses. This 
new virus, SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV), spread through 26 countries, with over 8000 
cases and 700 deaths before the chain of natural transmission was broken in late 2003 
(WHO, 2004).  
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One of the striking features of the SARS outbreak was its spread in healthcare 
facilities, resulting in transmission to patients, visitors, and healthcare workers (HCWs) 
(McDonald et al., 2004). The impact on HCWs in outbreak settings was significant; 
physicians (Chen et al., 2004), medical students (Wong et al., 2004), nurses (Loeb et al., 
2004), and emergency room personnel (Chen et al., 2004) became infected with SARS in 
the course of patient care, accounting for approximately 20% of cases by the time the 
outbreak was contained (Chan-Yeung, 2004; Lau et al., 2004). 
The spread of SARS in healthcare facilities focused attention on the role of surfaces 
and other fomites in spreading nosocomial viral infection. SARS-CoV nucleic acids have 
been identified on surfaces in hospitals where SARS outbreaks took place, illustrating 
that SARS-CoV may be deposited on hospital surfaces, which may then serve as a 
reservoir for subsequent transmission (Chen et al., 2004; Dowell et al., 2004, Booth et al., 
2005). These studies only examined nucleic acids, and could not make any conclusions 
about the presence of infectious SARS-CoV. However, previous research has shown that 
other enveloped viruses can survive on surfaces. Non-SARS coronaviruses, which have 
been previously recognized as a source of nosocomial infections (Gagneur et al., 2002), 
can survive on surfaces for up to 6 hours (Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 2000). Results of 
laboratory experiments with SARS on surfaces have found that SARS-CoV survives up 
to 9 days in the presence of 10% FCS and up to 6 days without FCS (Rabenau et al., 
2005).  
The possible survival of SARS-CoV on surfaces and objects has important infection 
control implications. Viral contamination of inanimate objects has been suggested as the 
vehicle for outbreaks of nosocomial viral infection (Roger et al., 2000). Controlled 
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studies have shown that when people come in contact with inanimate surfaces, they can 
both deposit viruses on these surfaces and acquire viruses from them (Rheinbaben et al., 
2000; Rusin, Gerba, and Maxwell, 2002), and viruses on hands can be transferred to the 
face during hand-to-face contact (Rusin, Gerba, and Maxwell, 2002). Once deposited on 
surfaces, some pathogenic viruses can remain viable for hours to days, even on porous 
materials such as gowns and lab coats (Brady, Evans, and Cuartas, 1990; Bean et al., 
1982; Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991; Sattar, Lloyd-Evans and Springthorpe, 
1986). Given that surfaces are a possible source for acquisition of SARS-CoV in the 
healthcare environment, and that the few available studies suggest possible long-term 
survival, more data are needed on the survival characteristics of this virus in healthcare 
environments, and the effect of environmental variables such as temperature and 
humidity on viral survival rates. Generating such data is complicated by the fact that 
SARS-CoV causes a possibly fatal droplet- and aerosol-transmitted disease, and can be 
handled only by trained personnel under biosafety level 3 conditions, restricting it to a 
few specialized laboratories. Even restricted to high containment laboratories, such 
research carries risks  There have been cases of laboratory-acquired SARS that occurred 
after the chain of natural transmission had been broken (Lim et al., 2004), posing a risk 
of reintroducing SARS into human populations. For a pathogen with these characteristics, 
the use of a surrogate virus for studying patterns of survival and transmission on surfaces 
is desirable. Studies using other members of the Coronaviridae may be able to provide 
insight into the survival, persistence, and transmission risks of SARS-CoV and other 
nosocomial coronaviruses on surfaces in the healthcare environment.  
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Surfaces and fomites may not be the only vehicles of nosocomial coronavirus 
transmission. An outbreak of SARS in a large apartment complex in Hong Kong 
suggested a role for contaminated water droplets and aerosols in the transmission of 
SARS. It was found that SARS-CoV shed in the feces of an infected individual visiting 
an apartment in one of the buildings of the complex may have spread via viral aerosols 
that entered the bathrooms of other apartments through faulty toilet plumbing and floor 
drains, transmitting SARS to other occupants of the building (McKinney et al., 2006). 
During outbreaks, it is possible that water becomes contaminated with SARS-CoV shed 
by infected individuals and that this water is subsequently aerosolized to serve as a 
vehicle of transmission.   
In addition, sinks, water baths, and whirlpools have been identified as foci for the 
spread of nosocomial infections (Squier, Yu, and Stout, 2000). These locations are likely 
to have standing water for extended periods.  If they become contaminated with SARS-
CoV from infected patients or the hands of healthcare workers caring for infected patients, 
virus may survive and remain infectious in water (Wang et al., 2005). Data on the 
survival of SARS in both contaminated and potable waters can help in quantifying and 
assessing the risk involved in this potential route of nosocomial spread.  
Although contaminated water droplets and aerosols are thought to have played a part 
in the transmission of community-acquired SARS, droplets and aerosols from the 
respiratory secretions of infected patients were a more common route of spread in 
healthcare environments. Several studies were done to determine how to protect HCWs 
from such transmission. Epidemiologic studies of the spread of SARS in healthcare 
environments established a crucial role for personal protective equipment (PPE), 
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including gowns, masks, and gloves, in preventing the spread of SARS to healthcare 
workers (Chen et al., 2004; Dwosh et al., 2003; Lau et al., 2004; Loeb et al., 2004; Seto 
et al., 2003). Although PPE certainly plays an important role in protecting healthcare 
workers from SARS and other more common respiratory pathogens (Gamage et al., 
2002), PPE is itself a kind of surface, and viruses can survive on the types of materials 
PPE is made from (Bean et al., 1982; Brady, Evans, and Cuartas 1990; Lai, Cheng, and 
Lim, 2005). Thus, items of PPE themselves may play a role in the transmission of disease 
if they become contaminated with infectious viruses. This exposure route has been 
recognized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which has a 
protocol outlining the proper sequence of removal of PPE items to minimize the risk of 
contamination to the wearer during removal (CDC, 2005). However, there is no empirical 
evidence proving that this protocol does or does not prevent the spread of viruses from 
contaminated PPE to the wearer during removal. The risk of viral transmission from 
contaminated PPE is also difficult to assess because data are lacking on how 
coronaviruses and other nosocomial viruses survive on the materials used to make PPE. 
Therefore, the possibility that PPE itself may be an environmental surface that 
contributes to the spread of viruses such as SARS-CoV remains research question in need 
of being addressed. Like the role of healthcare surfaces and reservoirs for coronavirus, 
this is another research question that might be addressed with the use of surrogate viruses 
to model survival and transmission dynamics. 
In summary, evidence from laboratory studies, environmental surveys, and 
epidemiologic studies suggests that environmental surfaces, including protective 
equipment worn by healthcare workers, may serve as vehicles for transmission of SARS-
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CoV in the healthcare environment. However, there are significant gaps in our knowledge 
both of how viruses may spread to healthcare workers in the course of using PPE, and 
how coronaviruses themselves survive on inanimate surfaces and objects, including PPE 
items, found in healthcare environments. To fill these crucial knowledge gaps, this 
research was undertaken with the following objectives: 
Research Objectives 
• Using MS2 as a model, develop methods for the recovery of infectious virus from 
multiple types of healthcare personal protective equipment, including gowns, masks, 
gloves, and goggles. 
• Using these virus recovery methods, estimate the probability that healthcare workers 
wearing virus-contaminated PPE who remove it using a US CDC protocol designed 
to minimize wearer contamination during removal will transfer virus to their hands, 
face, clothing worn underneath PPE, and to uncontaminated PPE. 
• Determine the survival rates of infectious coronaviruses in clean water and water 
contaminated with human fecal matter, using transmissible gastroenteritis virus and 
mouse hepatitis virus as surrogates. 
• Determine the effect of temperature and humidity on the survival rates of two human 
and two animal coronaviruses on hard, nonporous (stainless steel) surfaces. 
• Determine the effect of porous and nonporous surfaces found in healthcare 
environments, including plastic, ceramic, laminate, fabrics, and glove materials, on 
the survival rates of coronaviruses. 
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Review of the Literature 
SARS coronavirus 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was first recognized in February 2003 as 
an atypical pneumonia in an outbreak in Guandong, China (Rosling and Rosling, 2003). 
The first alert on SARS came from the World Health Organization in March 2003, as the 
illness spread to Vietnam, Hong Kong, Canada, Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore (Parry, 
2003). By May, the etiologic agent was identified almost simultaneously by two groups 
as a novel coronavirus (Rota et al.  2003; Drosten et al., 2003). The virus was not only 
unknown up to that point, but also unrelated to any of the currently known human or 
animal coronaviruses. This new virus, SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV), spread through 
26 countries, with over 8000 cases and 700 deaths before the chain of natural 
transmission was broken in late 2003 (WHO, 2004).  
The Coronaviridae, members of the order Nidovirales, are enveloped, single-stranded 
positive-sense RNA viruses approximately 60-200 nm in size. The family is divided into 
three groups, with Groups 1 and 2 containing the mammalian coronaviruses. They have 
an internal helical RNA-protein nucleocapsid, and an RNA genome that is `27–32 kb, 
with a 5' methylated cap and 3' poly-A. The structural proteins are the nucleocapsid (N) 
protein, complexed with genome RNA; the transmembrane glycoprotein (M); the spike 
protein (S); and the membrane associated E protein. Some Group 2 viruses contain an 
additional structural protein, the hemagglutinin-esterase protein (HE) (Navas-Martin and 
Weiss, 2003). Although analysis of the genome of SARS coronavirus suggests it is a 
possible late offshoot of the Group 2 coronaviruses (Snijder et al., 2003), sequence 
comparison does not place it in any of the currently described groups of coronaviruses 
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(Marra et al., 2003; Ruan et al., 2003), suggesting that it belongs in its own group within 
the Coronaviridae family. The polymerase gene sequence of SARS-CoV has similarities 
to the Group 2 coronaviruses, but this virus is not a host-range mutant of a known 
coronavirus, and is not a result of recombination between other known coronaviruses 
(Holmes and Enjuanes, 2003).  
SARS infection 
Acquisition 
SARS is transmitted by droplets (Seto et al., 2004) and aerosols (Li et al., 2005); 
protection against droplet exposures has been shown to lower the risk of infection (Seto 
et al., 2004). Further evidence for respiratory acquisition came from several studies 
demonstrating that wearing masks was protective against infection (Dwosh et al., 2003; 
Jefferson et al., 2008; Loeb et al., 2004; Seto et al., 2003). Virus could be transmitted 
both by close contact with infected patients (Wong et al., 2004), and could travel fairly 
long distances (i.e., multiple building floors) on air currents, as seen in a large apartment 
complex outbreak (Yu et al., 2004). The basic reproduction number for SARS (the 
average number of secondary cases generated by one primary case in a susceptible 
population) was initially estimated at 2.7 in Hong Kong, until reductions in onset-to-
hospitalization time, population contact rate, and hospital transmission reduced the 
reproduction number to drop to 1.0 (Riley et al., 2003). This suggests that during an 
outbreak, before transmission is recognized and control measures are put in place, one 
infected individual could generate two more infections. The infectious dose of SARS-
CoV is unknown. Using animal models, 106 median tissue culture infectious dose units 
(TCID50) have been shown to induce experimental infection in cats and ferrets (Martina 
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et al., 2003), and experiments using 103 or 10TCID50 have induced viral replication in the 
lungs of ferrets (ter Meulen et al., 2004), but the dose-response relationship is not known. 
Clinical course 
The WHO case definition of SARS was fever of 38°C or more, cough or shortness of 
breath, new pulmonary infiltrates on chest radiography, and a history of exposure to a 
patient with SARS or absence of response to empirical antimicrobial coverage for typical 
and atypical pneumonia (β lactams and macrolides, fluoroquinolones, or tetracyclines). 
SARS infection is characterized by fever on presentation, chest x-ray abnormalities, 
chills and/or rigor, myalgia, cough, and headache. SARS is an infection with both 
respiratory and enteric involvement, as seen in two Hong Kong outbreaks. In one, 
diarrhea was seen in 73% of patients (Peiris et al., 2003). In another, 38% of 140 patients 
had watery diarrhea, without the presence of blood or mucus. More significantly, 
evidence of viral replication was found in biopsied intestinal tissues (Leung et al., 2003), 
indicating that the intestine is a site of active viral replication. However, the most severe 
effects of the disease are a result of respiratory compromise. The course of illness as 
charted by Peiris et al. (2003) for 75 patients in Hong Kong showed that 20% developed 
adult respiratory distress syndrome and required mechanical ventilation, and 7% died, of 
myocardial infarction, sepsis, and ARDS. Peires et al. described the clinical course: 
Week 1: fever, myalgia, and other systemic symptoms that generally improve after 
a few days. The increasing viral load during this phase suggests that the symptoms are 
largely related to the effect of viral replication and cytolysis.  
Week 2: the patients frequently had recurrence of fever, onset of diarrhea, and 
oxygen desaturation. Strikingly, nearly half the patients had shifting radiographic 
shadows. If viral-induced damage was the primary pathological mechanism, such a 
flitting pattern of radiological change is difficult to explain. The timing of the IgG 
seroconversion, which starts on day 10, seems to correlate with falls in viral load, 
which occurs from between day 10 and 15, despite the use of pulse 
methylprednisolone. Severe clinical worsening also occurs at this time, which cannot 
be explained by uncontrolled viral replication. This finding is supported by the 
progressive decrease in rates of viral shedding from nasopharynx, stool, and urine 
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from day 10 to 21 after onset of symptoms in the 20 patients who underwent 
prospective follow-up with RT-PCR.  
20% of patients in this cohort progressed to the third phase, characterized by 
ARDS necessitating ventilatory support. Inevitably, several patients developed 
nosocomial sepsis during this phase of end-organ damage and severe lymphopenia. 
 
Virus shedding and viral load 
RT-PCR analysis of samples from this patient series found SARS-CoV RNA in 
nasopharyngeal aspirates, urine, and stool. Viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates peaked 
on day 10 of infection, at 7.3 log10 RNA copies/mL (Peires et al., 2003). Chu et al., 
(2004) found that viral load in nasopharyngeal specimens collected at patient presentation 
were as high as 8.8 log10 RNA copies/mL, and that viral load was associated with 
eventual mortality. A study of 150 Hong Kong patients found the highest viral load by 
RT-PCR was highest for stool specimens with 6.1 log10 copies/mL, followed by urine 
with 4.4 log10 copies/mL and nasopharyngeal specimens with 2.4 log10 copies/mL. Again, 
viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates was associated with mortality (Hung et al, 2004). 
Peak viral load in throat washes from patients in a Taiwan outbreak ranged from 3-4 log10 
RNA copies/mL (Wang et al., 2004). Although PCR titer likely overestimate the load of 
infectious virus in patient secretions, the viral loads in these studies suggest that levels of 
infectious virus in body fluids may be high enough to pose a risk of infection to HCWs 
who come in contact with patient secretions, but more information about the dose-
response relationship of SARS-CoV is needed. 
SARS in healthcare workers 
Droplets and aerosols were identified as the principal transmission routes of SARS (Li 
et al., 2003; Tang et al., 2006). One of the striking features of the SARS outbreak was its 
spread in healthcare facilities, resulting in transmission to patients, visitors, and HCWs. 
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There were multiple instances of SARS in healthcare facilities in several countries. A 
summary of these outbreaks is shown in Table  1-1.  
Table  1-1. Outbreaks of SARS in healthcare facilities 
Site Facility type Outbreak Reference 
Singapore Tertiary acute care 
hospital 
Single index patient led to five clusters of 
infection; 24 healthcare workers, 15 patients, 
12 visitors affected 
Chow et al., 2004 
Toronto Community 
hospital 
Began with relative of Toronto index case; 
eight nurses affected 
Loeb et al., 2004 
Toronto hospital Case in nurse linked to participation in 
resuscitation of SARS patient 
Christian et al., 
2004 
Toronto hospital Began with relative of Toronto index case; 
128 SARS cases (72 probable, 56 suspect) 
Varia et al., 2003 
Toronto hospital Second wave of SARS transmission; linked 
to continued unrecognized SARS 
transmission in a community hospital after 
infection control measures were relaxed 
CDC, 2003 
Taiwan municipal hospital exposure from a "super-spreader" with SARS 
and an infected hospital laundry attendant 
who continued working while ill; at least 137 
probable cases, including 45 in healthcare 
workers. 
McDonald et al., 
2004 
Taiwan University hospital index case came through ER, linked to 
municipal hospital outbreak; three clusters of 
SARS in patients, family members, and 
HCWs 
Chen et al., 2004 
Hong Kong Five hospitals 77 probable and suspected cases Lau et al., 2004 
Hong Kong community 
hospital 
40 hospital workers infected; included 
physicians, nurses, health assistants 
Ho et al., 2003 
Ontario community 
hospital 
10 suspected cases among hospital staff Dwosh et al., 2003 
Hong Kong teaching hospital cluster of infections among medical students 
exposed to a SARS case 
Wong et al., 2004 
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The impact of SARS on HCWs in outbreak settings was highly important. Physicians, 
medical students, nurses, and support personnel became infected with SARS in the course 
of patient care, accounting for approximately 20% of known total cases by the time the 
outbreak was contained (Chan-Yeung, 2004; Lau et al., 2004). This awareness of 
infection risk led to several investigations of the role of personal protective equipment for 
protecting HCWs from SARS, including epidemiologic studies examining the role of 
PPE in protecting HCWs in facilities treating SARS patients.  
Personal protective equipment (PPE) is a vital tool in healthcare environments to 
protect healthcare workers (HCWs) from exposure to human pathogens during patient 
care activities. PPE refers to a variety of barriers and respirators used alone or in 
combination to protect mucous membranes, airways, skin, and clothing from contact with 
infectious agents. It includes liquid-proof gowns, face masks, gloves, and eye shields, 
which prevent occupational exposure to pathogens causing tuberculosis, influenza, 
measles, varicella, and other infectious diseases (Siegel et al., 2007). Studies 
demonstrated that use of PPE could protect HCWs from SARS infection in the workplace. 
In a Hong Kong study of HCWs exposed to SARS patients, not wearing masks was 
significantly associated with illness (Seto et al., 2003).  A case-control study in Toronto 
found inconsistent use of PPE was associated with higher risk of infection (Lau et al., 
2004). A retrospective cohort study of nurses at a Toronto hospital found use of masks 
was associated with a significantly lower risk of infection (Loeb et al., 2004).  Another 
study showed that cases of SARS among hospital staff all occurred before respiratory 
precautions, including wearing of PPE, were begun. After all staff were required to wear 
PPE for respiratory protection, no additional staff members became infected (Dwosh et 
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al., 2003). Meta-analysis of published studies found that masks, (OR=0.32, 95% CI 0.25 
to 0.40), N95 respirators (OR=0.09, 9% CI 0.03 to 0.30) and gloves (OR=0.43, 95% CI 
0.29 to 0.65) were effective in preventing the transmission of SARS. Handwashing, 
masks, gloves, and gowns combined were also found to be protective (OR=0.09, 95% CI 
0.02 to 0.35) (Jefferson et al., 2008). Epidemiologic studies of PPE in preventing SARS 
transmission are summarized in Table  1-2.  
Table  1-2. Epidemiologic studies of PPE and SARS infection among healthcare workers 
Study type Population Findings Reference 
Matched case-
control  
HCWs in a cluster of 5 
Hong Kong hospitals 
Inconsistent use of PPE associated 
with SARS infection; possible PPE 
shortages  
Lau et al., 2004 
Case-control Doctors and nurses in a 
hospital in Hanoi, 
Vietnam 
Use of masks was significantly 
protective against SARS 
transmission 
Nishiura et al., 
2005 
Case-control HCWs in a cluster of 5 
Hong Kong hospitals 
mask, gloves, gowns, and hand-
washing evaluated; all infected staff 
had omitted at least one measure; 
masks significantly protective 
against infection 
Seto et al., 2003 
Case-control HCWs in a Singapore 
hospital 
N95 masks were significantly 
protective against SARS 
Teleman et al., 
2004 
Matched case-
control 
Probable SARS cases in 
Beijing 
Masks were strongly protective 
against SARS 
Wu et al., 2004 
Case- Control staff members from ten 
hospitals in Guangdong, 
China 
Masks and goggles were 
significantly protective 
Yin et al., 2004; 
Jefferson et al., 
2008 
Retrospective 
cohort 
Nurses in two Toronto 
critical care units 
N95 masks were significantly 
protective against SARS 
Loeb et al., 2004 
 
Although PPE plays an important role in preventing transmission of infectious 
diseases from patients to healthcare workers, there were concerns that contaminated PPE 
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may play a role in the spread of infectious agents when it is handled during removal. To 
minimize the risk of HCW contamination during the removal of personal protective 
equipment, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention designed a protocol for the 
safe removal of PPE (Siegel et al, 2007). However, the risks of pathogen exposure from 
contaminated PPE are not well understood. It is possible that items of PPE that become 
contaminated could serve as fomites, transferring infectious organisms from surfaces to 
hands and other surfaces. The frequency and efficiency of such transfer, however, is not 
known. Pittet et al (2006) described five steps necessary for pathogens to be transferred 
from patient to patient via healthcare workers’ hands (Figure  1-1). 
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Figure  1-1. Sequence of events for transfer of organisms via hands in healthcare environments (from 
Pittet et al., 2006). 
 
Contaminated PPE can play a role in steps 1-2. If patients shed viruses onto healthcare 
workers’ PPE in the course of patient care, these viruses can remain infectious when PPE 
is removed, and subsequent transfer of viruses from contaminated PPE to hands is a 
possibility. Transfer of viruses between hands and experimentally contaminated 
inanimate objects has been demonstrated in controlled laboratory experiments. Materials 
tested include stainless steel, fabrics (Rusin, Maxwell, and Gerba, 2002), plastic 
(Gwaltney and Hendley, 1982), and gloves (Hall, Douglas, and Geiman, 1980). Studies 
Organisms are present on the patient's skin or 
have been shed onto inanimate objects 
immediately surrounding the patient 
Organisms must be transferred to the hands 
of health-care workers. 
Organisms must be capable of surviving for 
at least several minutes on health-care 
workers' hands. 
Healthcare worker hand hygiene must be 
inadequate or absent, or the agent used for 
hand hygiene inappropriate. 
The contaminated hand(s) of the caregiver 
must come into direct contact with another 
patient or with an inanimate object that will 
come into direct contact with the patient 
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of viral transfer between hands and fomites demonstrate variable efficiency of transfer 
depending on surface type and virus type, with transfer efficiency reduced substantially 
by drying of the virus on the surface. These studies are summarized in Table  1-3.  
Table  1-3. Studies of virus transfer between hands and surfaces 
Transfer type Virus Efficiency Reference 
Hand to stainless steel; 
stainless steel to hand 
rotavirus 16% 20 min after hand 
contamination; 
2% 60 min after hand 
contamination 
Ansari et al., 1998 
Hand to stainless steel; 
stainless steel to hand 
hepatitis A disk to hand: 28% 20 min after 
hand contamination; 10% 60 
min after hand contamination 
Hand to disk: 36% 20 min 
after hand contamination; 26% 
60 min after hand 
contamination 
Mbithi et al., 1992 
stainless steel to hands rhinovirus 0.58% after drying of virus Sattar et al., 1993 
Hand to stainless steel; 
stainless steel to hand 
rhinovirus hand to disk, 0.92% after 20 
min drying; disk to hand, 
0.67% after 20 min drying 
Ansari et al., 1991 
Hand to stainless steel; 
stainless steel to hand 
human 
parainfluenza 
hand to disk, 0% after 20 min 
drying; disk to hand, 1.48% 
after 20 min drying 
Ansari et al., 1991 
metal faucet to hand bacteriophage 
PRD-1 
33% transfer Rusin, Maxwell, and 
Gerba, 2002 
fabric to hand bacteriophage 
PRD-1 
<0.01% transfer Rusin, Maxwell, and 
Gerba, 2002 
plastic to hand rhinovirus 5/10 recipients infected after 
exposure to contaminated cup 
handles; 9/16 infected after 
exposure to contaminated 
plastic tiles. 
Gwaltney and Hendley, 
1982 
latex glove to hand respiratory 
syncytial virus 
transfer from latex gloves to 
fingers up to 25 min after 
contamination 
Hall, Douglas, and 
Geiman, 1980 
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These studies of experimental transfer suggest the possibility that viruses can transfer 
from PPE to hands when contaminated items are handled in the course of PPE removal 
and disposal. In addition, contamination can be present on skin after exposure to 
pathogens even when PPE is worn (Zamora et al., 2006), and may be transferred to used 
items of PPE if they are handled after removal. Virus transfer between hands and PPE 
items can encourage both accidental autoinoculation by the healthcare worker and 
subsequent transmission of viruses to other patients, staff, or family members, especially 
when inadequate hand hygiene is practiced (Pittet et al., 2006).  
As indicated in (Figure  1-1). 
Figure  1-1, organisms must be shed onto inanimate objects in order to begin the chain 
of transmission via hands. However, these organisms must survive on inanimate objects, 
such as PPE, long enough to be transferred to hands. There have been few studies 
assessing the survival of pathogens on materials used to make personal protective 
equipment (Yassi et al., 2005). Studies of pathogen survival on N95 respirators have 
evaluated bacteria, and indicate that bacterial spores can survive up to 12 days with only 
1-2 log10 reduction in infectious titer (Wang, 1999); other types of bacteria can survive on 
masks for days (Rengasamy et al., 2004). Some investigations have found that viruses 
can survive on materials used to make other types of PPE. When deposited in high 
numbers (~106 TCID50), SARS-CoV has been found to survive on gowns for up to 2 days 
(Lai, Cheng, and Lim, 2005). Enveloped ssRNA viruses have been shown to survive on 
latex glove material; respiratory syncytial virus can survive on gloves for up to 1.5 hours 
(Hall, Douglas, and Geiman, 1980).  Human coronavirus 229E can survive on gloves for 
up to 2 hours, although it loses up to 85% of its infectious titer (Sizun et al., 2000), and 
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avian influenza virus can survive for up to 6 days without loss of infectious titer (Tiwari 
et al., 2005). Non-enveloped ssRNA viruses such as human rotavirus and hepatitis A 
virus can survive for several days on latex under ambient conditions, with only ~1 log10 
loss in infectious titer (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994). These studies suggest that viruses 
have the potential to survive on PPE materials for much longer than single-use PPE is 
usually worn, creating the potential for viral transfer when PPE is handled after wearing. 
Nosocomial viruses on surfaces 
PPE items are not the only fomites that may play a role in the transmission of viral 
infection in healthcare environments. Environmental surfaces in hospital environments 
have been recognized as sources of nosocomial infection, possibly serving as reservoirs 
for viral pathogens such as influenza, norovirus, rotavirus and SARS-CoV (Hota, 2004). 
Possible evidence of SARS-CoV has been found on hospital surfaces during a SARS 
outbreak. Sampling of surfaces in hospitals during SARS outbreaks, including surfaces in 
patient rooms and areas on floors used for isolation of SARS patients, found SARS-CoV 
nucleic acids on surfaces and inanimate objects in patient rooms, nurses’ stations, and 
public areas of the hospital (Booth et al., 2005; Dowell et al, 2004). Infectious virus was 
not cultured from any of the samples, so it is unclear whether the presence of viral 
nucleic acid indicates that infectious SARS-CoV is present on hospital surfaces in 
outbreak settings. The presence of nucleic acids, however, suggests the possibility that 
infectious virus was present on these surfaces for a period of time, and these surfaces 
could become sources of further viral transmission.  
Assessing the risk posed by SARS-CoV on surfaces requires data on how long viruses 
survive on inanimate surfaces and the influence of temperature, humidity, and surface 
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type on viral survival. Several studies have been done on the survival of SARS-CoV on 
surfaces, including paper, cotton, and various nonporous surfaces. Studies of SARS-CoV 
survival on surfaces are shown in Table  1-4.  
 
Table  1-4. Survival of SARS-CoV on surfaces 
Surface type Survival Reference 
paper 24 hr when starting titer is 106 
TCID50; 3 hr when 105; <5 min 
when 104 (kinetics not studied) 
Lai, Cheng, and Lim, 2005 
disposable gown 2d when starting titer is 106 
TCID50; 24 hr when 105; 1 min 
when 104 (kinetics not studied) 
Lai, Cheng, and Lim, 2005 
cotton gown 24 hr when starting titer is 106 
TCID50; 1 hr when 105; 5 min 
when 104 (kinetics not studied) 
Lai, Cheng, and Lim, 2005 
polystyrene petri dish 4 log10 reduction in infectious 
titer over 9 days 
Rabenau et al., 2005 
plaster 24 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
plastic 36 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
formica 36 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
stainless steel 36 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
wood 12 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
cotton fabric 12 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
slide 72 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
paper 24 hr (initial titer 104 TCID50) WHO, 2003 
 
When deposited in high numbers, SARS-CoV can remain infectious for days on 
surfaces. Survival is generally longer on nonporous surfaces than porous surfaces. The 
data in Table 4 was gathered on SARS-CoV survival at room temperature. However, 
temperature and humidity were not controlled variables in these studies, making it 
difficult to ascertain the effect of these variables on SARS-CoV stability in the 
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environment. There are limited data available on the survival of other, non-SARS 
coronaviruses on surfaces, and similar to the data for SARS-CoV, they often did not 
measure the effects of temperature and humidity variation on survival. Data on human 
coronavirus survival on surfaces are shown in Table  1-5.  
Table  1-5. Survival of non-SARS human coronaviruses on surfaces (from Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 
2000) 
Surface type Virus type Survival 
aluminum 229E loses 80% of infectivity in 3 hr; decline of 5 log10  
infectivity by 6 hr 
sponge 229E loses 90% of infectivity in 6 hr; decline of 5 log10  
infectivity by 12 hr 
latex 229E loses 80% of infectivity in 3 hr; decline of 5 log10  
infectivity by 6 hr 
aluminum OC43 decline of 5 log10  infectivity by 3 hr 
sponge OC43 decline of 5 log10  infectivity by 1 hr 
latex OC43 decline of 5 log10  infectivity by 1 hr 
 
The results of these studies on human coronaviruses 229E and OC43 suggest that they 
are inactivated much more quickly on both porous and nonporous surfaces than is SARS-
CoV. This suggests that these viruses may be of limited utility in predicting the survival 
of SARS-CoV on environmental surfaces. Given the paucity of available information on 
coronavirus survival on environmental surfaces, comparison to the survival of other 
viruses may provide some insight into the survival of SARS-CoV on environmental 
surfaces and the effect of variables such as temperature, humidity, and surface type on 
survival.  
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Virus survival on environmental surfaces 
Effect of viral type and structure on survival 
Studies of viral survival on surfaces have shown that virus type and structure affects 
survival on surfaces. The presence or absence of a lipid envelope affects how long 
viruses can survive on surfaces, with non-enveloped viruses generally having longer 
survival than enveloped viruses. Non-enveloped viruses can survive on nonporous 
surfaces for weeks with very little decline in titer (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Abad et 
al., 2001), whereas enveloped viruses such as avian influenza can exhibit a 1-2 log10 
decline in infectious titer over 72 hours and >3 log10 decline in 6 days (Tiwari et al., 
2006). Human influenza is inactivated relatively quickly, showing a 3 log10 decline in 
infectious titer after 24 hours on stainless steel (Noyce, Michels, and Keevil, 2007). Other 
enveloped viruses are inactivated even more rapidly on surfaces; cytomegalovirus, 
another enveloped virus, survives for only 8 hours on glass (Faix, 1984), and human 
respiratory coronaviruses OC43 and 229E lose 100% of their infectivity on metal 
surfaces within 3 hours (Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 2000). Cell-free preparations of human 
immunodeficiency virus suspended in serum appear somewhat more resistant on surfaces, 
losing 2 log10 infectious titer per week (van Bueren et al., 1994). Although both 
enveloped and non-enveloped viruses can persist on surfaces for days if deposited in high 
enough numbers, the evidence suggests that the rates of inactivation on surfaces are much 
higher for viruses with lipid envelopes than for non-enveloped viruses.  
Effect of genome structure on survival 
Previous studies of viral disinfection offer some insight into the possible effects of 
genome structure on virus susceptibility to disinfectants, and may provide useful 
information on mechanisms might influence virus survival on environmental surfaces. It 
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has been posited that double stranded DNA genomes, such as adenovirus, are more 
resistant to damage by UV radiation, as suggested by experiments showing that 
adenoviruses have greater resistance to inactivation by UV irradiation of water than 
ssRNA viruses. If one strand of a dsDNA genome is damaged, the other strand can still 
serve as a template, allowing host cell enzymes to repair damage to the viral nucleic acid 
(Thurston-Enriquez et al., 2003).  
Although differences in nucleic acid structure may explain the differential 
susceptibility of viruses to disinfectant agents, investigations of viral survival suggest that 
it is not the most important factor affecting survival of viruses dried onto surfaces. Other 
structural componenets of viruses besides their nucleic acids may influence the 
persistence of virus infectivity in the environment.  Studies of adenovirus, a dsDNA virus, 
have shown that it may not survive as long on surfaces as some ssRNA viruses (Abad, 
Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Abad et al., 2001). Adenoviruses exhibit greater inactivation 
during desiccation than ssRNA viruses such as HAV and HRV (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 
1994). This may be due to the presence of penton fibers on the adenovirus viral capsid, 
which mediate attachment to the host cell and are important for infection (Zubieta et al., 
2004). Damage to these fibers caused by desiccation may play a role in the loss of 
infectivity of this virus when dried onto surfaces (Sattar, personal communication). This 
is reinforced by the observation that bacteriophage B40-8, a dsDNA tailed phage, 
survives significantly longer on surfaces than adenovirus, and has inactivation rates more 
similar to those seen for hepatitis A virus (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994). Therefore, 
although dsDNA genomes may have greater stability or ability to undergo repair, this 
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may not be the most important virus structural factor influencing viral survival on 
surfaces; the fate of outer structural components of the virion may play a greater role. 
More information on the role of genome structure on virus survival may be gleaned 
from studies comparing the survival of ssRNA and dsRNA viruses on surfaces. Hepatitis 
A, a ssRNA virus, survives significantly longer on aluminum surfaces when compared to 
the dsRNA human rotavirus, but rotavirus survived significantly longer on a nonporous 
surface, paper. On latex, there was no difference in the survival of the two viruses. 
Although the relationship between genome structure and survival varies by surface type 
for ssRNA and dsRNA, these same studies showed that rotavirus survived significantly 
longer on all surface types than did adenovirus (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994). Like 
adenovirus, rotavirus has viral capsid proteins, some with associated carbohydrates, that 
protrude from the capsid surface, and as in the case of adenovirus, these protruding 
proteins may be sensitive to desiccation.  These results suggest that the outer capsid 
structures may play a greater role in viral survival on surfaces than the structure of the 
viral genome.  
Effects of temperature on survival 
Survival of non-enveloped viruses such as hepatitis A, poliovirus and adenovirus is 
enhanced at low temperatures (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Abad et al., 2001; Mbithi, 
Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991). Survival of rotavirus was enhanced at low temperatures 
at medium and high RH; the rate of virus inactivation at the high RH level at 4°C was 
significantly lower than at 22°C. (Sattar et al., 1986). Enveloped viruses follow similar 
patterns; coronaviruses are inactivated more slowly at lower temperatures (Tennant, 
Gaskell, and Gaskell, 1994). This greater survival at lower temperature is similar to 
results observed for virus survival in aerosols (Ijaz et al., 1985) and water (Yates, Gerba, 
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and Kelley, 1985; Enriquez, Hurst, and Gerba, 1995). The effect of temperature on virus 
survival on surfaces appears to be similar to the effects of temperature in other 
environmental media such as air and water. 
Effects of humidity on survival 
Studies on the relationship between virus survival and relative humidity has not 
elucidated a clear and consistent relationship. Survival of some non-enveloped viruses is 
greater at high relative humidity (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994). Studies of hepatitis A 
have found that between 25 and 95% RH, the survival of virus on surface is inversely 
proportional to the RH level. These investigations also found that the relationship 
between HAV survival and RH at 20°C was the same as at 5°C, with higher relative 
humidity levels resulting in shorter survival times. Although the basic relationship 
remained the same, the effect of humidity on survival was “less pronounced” at lower 
temperatures compared to higher temperatures (Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991). 
Opposite results were found for human rotavirus on stainless steel, plastic, and glass; 
rates of viral inactivation were higher at 50% RH than at 25%, and higher at 80% RH 
than at 50%. Rotavirus could still remain infectious at 25% and 50% RH for up to 12 
days with little loss of infectivity (Sattar et al., 1986). Human rhinovirus behaved 
similarly; survival on surfaces was 14 hours at high RH but only 2 hr at low RH (Sattar et 
al., 1987). In studies of effects of relative humidity and temperature on the survival of 
human rotavirus as a thin layer of faeces on an impervious surface and on absorbent 
material, virus infectivity was very stable at low and high relative humidities but not in 
the medium range of relative humidity (Moe and Shirely, 1982). Rotavirus infectivity 
declines more rapidly under all humidities at 37° C than at 4°C or 20°C. (Moe and 
Shirley, 1982) For enveloped viruses in aerosols, previous studies have reported greater 
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virus survival in at lower relative humidity than higher relative humidity.  Semliki Forest 
Virus in aged aerosols lost its infectivity more rapidly as the humidity was increased 
(Benbough, 1961). This longer survival of viruses in aerosols at lower relative humidity 
has also been reported for vaccinia, influenza and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis 
viruses (Harper, 1963) The effects of low (10%), intermediate (35%) and high (90%) RH 
were studied at 23°C and with four aerosolized viruses: Newcastle disease virus, 
infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus, vesicular stomatitis virus, and bacteriophageT3. 
Virus loss on aerosol generation was consistently lower at 90% than at 10 or 35% RH. 
When stored at 23°C, Newcastle disease virus and vesicular stomatitis virus survived best 
at 10% RH, while infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus and bacteriophage T3 survived 
best at 90% RH (Songer, 1967).  
The available data suggest that although rates of inactivation of most viruses are 
slower at lower temperatures, the effects on RH on virus survival differ among viruses.  
High relative humidity appears to enhance the survival of some viruses, low relative 
humidity appears to enhance the survival of other viruses, and for some viruses survival 
is better at low and high RH levels than at 50% RH.  Therefore, the relationship between 
humidity and virus inactivation is still not entirely clear, and may differ by virus type 
(Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991). 
Effects of surface type and porosity on survival 
Virus survival has been observed to be shorter on porous than nonporous surfaces for 
some viruses, but other viruses show no difference. Non-enveloped viruses can persist for 
weeks on latex and paper surfaces with 1-3 log10 decline in infectious titer, compared to 
~1 log10 on aluminum surfaces (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994). Abad et al. (2001) found 
similar survival of non-enveloped viruses on china and paper. Enveloped avian influenza 
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viruses can remain stable on latex for up to 6 days, which is longer than their survival on 
steel surfaces, but lose >1 log10 infectious titer within 48 hours on fabric (Tiwari et al., 
2006). No difference was observed in the survival of human coronaviruses 229E and 
OC43 on aluminum vs. latex surfaces (Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 2000). On metal surfaces, 
the metal type can affect survival; under identical conditions, human influenza loses 2 
log10 infectious titer on stainless steel in 6 hours, but 4 log10 on copper surfaces (Noyce, 
Michels, and Keevil, 2007). Rotavirus survival on paper and cloth was found to be highly 
variable, with virus recovered from cloth for days, but inactivated on paper immediately 
after drying (Sattar et al., 1986). Results suggest that the effect of porous vs. nonporous 
surfaces may differ by virus type. In comparing both within and across studies, the effect 
of differences in viral elution efficiency from different types of surfaces is difficult to 
evaluate. It may be that the efficiency of virus elution from porous surfaces, such as 
fabrics, is lower than that of nonporous surfaces. In comparisons within the same studies 
using the same elution methods, however, it appears that the major differences in virus 
survival are found between hard nonporous surfaces (steel, aluminum, china) and porous 
surfaces (paper, fabric), while the effects of soft nonporous surfaces such as latex are less 
clear. Studies of virus survival on surfaces indicate a few trends:  
• Non-enveloped viruses survive longer with less decline in infectivity than enveloped 
viruses 
• lower temperatures reduce rates of viral inactivation compared to higher temperatures 
• virus survival tends to be greater at high RH levels compared to low RH levels 
Although some studies found a protective effect of high relative humidity, the effect of 
relative humidity on virus survival is not clear, and how the humidity level interacts with 
temperature to affect viral survival on surfaces is also not completely clear from the 
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current literature. There does not appear to be a definitive relationship between genome 
structure and survival on surfaces, although this is difficult to elucidate because much of 
the available literature examines only single-stranded RNA viruses. It may be that the 
kinetics of viral survival on surfaces are modulated by the effects of temperature, 
humidity, desiccation, and other variables on the outer structures of virions. Enveloped 
viruses, and viruses with protein and carbohydrate structures protruding from the outer 
capsid, appear to be more sensitive to the effects of desiccation than viruses without these 
structures, suggesting that oxidation of lipid envelopes and damage to protruding capsid 
proteins that mediate infection may play an important role in viral inactivation on 
surfaces. These modulating effects may differ among virus types. In order to fully 
understand the relationships among temperature, humidity, virus type, surface type, and 
survival, these experiments need to be replicated with multiple virus types under similar 
exposure conditions. 
 CHAPTER 2 
Experimental design and methods 
Selection of surrogate viruses 
The family Coronaviridae consists of three taxonomic groups, encompassing human, 
mammalian, and avian viruses. Sequencing and genetic analysis of the SARS-CoV 
genome currently place it as a possible late offshoot of the Group 2 coronaviruses 
(Snijder et al., 2003), but not a member of any of the currently recognized groups (Marra 
et al., 2003; Ruan et al., 2003), making it difficult to identify a member of the 
Coronaviridae most closely related to SARS-CoV. Because of its uncertain place within 
the family, surrogate viruses for studying the environmental survival of coronaviruses 
were chosen from Groups 1 and 2, which contain the mammalian coronaviruses (Group 3 
has only one member, the avian infectious bronchitis virus). This allows for the collection 
of data to address possible differences in survival and persistence between the two groups 
of mammalian coronaviruses, and will allow for later comparison to SARS-CoV itself if 
future genetic analysis pinpoints more precisely its place within the family. Candidate 
surrogates were therefore chosen from two groups, with a human and an animal virus 
selected from each group: transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) and human 
coronavirus 229E from Group 1, and mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) from Group 2.  
Surrogates for modeling the transmission of viruses during removal of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) needed to be 1) appropriate surrogates for viruses known to 
cause nosocomial infection and 2) acceptable for use in experiments with human 
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volunteers. The coronaviruses described above for use in survival experiments are either 
human respiratory pathogens or animal pathogens whose potential risk for zoonotic 
transmission would be difficult to assess, making them unacceptable for use with human 
volunteers.  
Testing of the effectiveness of handwashing agents and of PPE materials as barriers 
against viruses has been done using bacteriophages as surrogates for pathogenic human 
viruses (Lytle and Baker, 1999; Sickbert-Bennett et al., 2005). Some nosocomial viral 
pathogens, including SARS-CoV and influenza, are enveloped, suggesting an enveloped 
bacteriophage might be a candidate surrogate for modeling the behavior of enveloped 
viruses in these experiments. There is one such phage, Φ6. Pseudomonas phage Φ6 is a 
member of the Cystoviridae, an enveloped, dsRNA phage whose host bacterium is 
Pseudomonas syringae (Laurinavičius et al., 2004). However, there are difficulties 
involved in working with this bacteriophage due to the fact that its host bacterium is a 
regulated plant pathogen that requires U.S. Department of Agriculture permits for 
possession (USDA, 2008).  
Genome structure is also an important factor in the selection of a surrogate. Many of 
the viruses that have been identified as important causes of nosocomial viral infection or 
have high potential for nosocomial transmission, such as SARS-CoV, influenza, 
parainfluenza, mumps, measles, respiratory syncytial virus, and noroviruses, are single 
stranded RNA viruses. The dsRNA genome of Φ6 differs from that of most hospital-
acquired viruses; the only nosocomial viral pathogen of interest with a dsRNA genome is 
the rotavirus (ICTV, 2002). This difference in genome composition is also a factor with 
bacteriophage ΦX174, a non-enveloped ssDNA phage of the family Microviridae (ICTV, 
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2002) commonly used for barrier testing of PPE (Lytle and Baker, 1999). Previous 
studies on environmental survival of viruses on surfaces have shown differences in 
survival between DNA and RNA viruses (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994), suggesting that 
a single-stranded RNA virus may be a more appropriate surrogate for modeling the 
behavior of common nosocomial viruses, as well as SARS-CoV. 
Bacteriophage MS2, a virus of the family Leviviridae, genus Levivirus, is a 24-26 nm, 
non-enveloped, ssRNA virus (ICTV, 2002). MS2 has been extensively used as a 
surrogate for studying the survival and persistence of pathogenic human ssRNA viruses 
(Bae and Schwab, 2007; Bourget et al., 2007; Dawson et al., 2005; Enriquez et al., 2003; 
Finch and Fairbairn, 1991; Helmer and Finch, 1993). It has also previously been used for 
testing the efficacy of hand hygiene agents in human volunteer studies, and has an 
acceptable safety profile for studies using human volunteers (Sickbert-Bennett et al., 
2005). Because of its similarity in genome composition to many important nosocomial 
viral pathogens, as well as its safety profile for use with human volunteers, MS2 was 
chosen as a surrogate virus for modeling the transfer of virus on healthcare PPE in human 
volunteer experiments. 
Preparation of coronavirus stocks 
TGEV and MHV were kindly provided by R. Baric, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill; 229E and OC43 were kindly provided by D. Erdman, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.  Cell lines were obtained from the American Type 
Culture Collection (Manassass, VA). Cell lines used were: swine testicular cells (ST, 
ATCC #CRL-1746) for TGEV; delayed brain tumor cells (DBT) for MHV; and human 
lung fibroblast cells (MRC-5, ATCC# CCL-171) for 229E. Viral stocks were propagated 
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by infecting confluent layers of host cell cultures in flasks, harvesting cell lysates, 
clarifying by centrifugation (3000×g, 30 min, 4°C), and storing resulting supernatants as 
virus stock at -80°C. Viral titers were determined by quantal assays on confluent host cell 
layers in 24-well plates and virus concentration was expressed as the most probable 
number (MPN).  
Coronavirus Infectivity assays 
TGEV and MHV were propagated and assayed in host cells with maintenance medium 
consisting of Eagle’s  minimum essential medium (MEM), 7.5% sodium bicarbonate, 
HEPES buffer, 10% bovine serum replacement (Fetal Clone II, Hyclone, Logan, UT), 
10% lactalbumin hydrolysate, non-essential amino acids, 1 mM sodium pyruvate and 
gentamicin (0.1 mg/mL)/kanamycin (0.05 mg/mL). Coronavirus 229E was propagated 
and assayed in host cells with maintenance medium consisting of Eagle’s  minimum 
essential medium (MEM), 10% newborn calf serum (Hyclone, Logan, UT),  7.5% 
sodium bicarbonate, HEPES buffer, glutamine, non-essential amino acids, 1 mM sodium 
pyruvate, gentamicin (0.1 mg/mL)/kanamycin (0.05 mg/mL) and nystatin (100 U/mL). 
Coronavirus survival in water 
Reagent-grade water was produced from laboratory tap water by a Dracor™ water 
purification system (Dracor, Durham, NC) which includes reverse osmosis and ultraviolet 
light treatment. Lake water came from University Lake, an impoundment that serves as 
the drinking water source for the town of Chapel Hill, and was obtained from the raw 
water inlet of the Orange Water and Sewer Authority (OWASA) drinking water treatment 
plant. Settled sewage was obtained from the OWASA waste water reclamation facility, 
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and was pasteurized in a waterbath at 70°C for 3 hours to inactivate other 
microorganisms that would interfere with cell culture infectivity assays of coronaviruses. 
For each virus, 5 mL of clarified virus stock was spiked into duplicate 45 mL aliquots 
of test water. A positive control sample for measuring the initial virus concentration in 
water at time 0 was taken and assayed immediately after spiking. One aliquot of test 
water was held at room temperature (23-25°C), and one was held at refrigerator 
temperature (4°C). At each time point, samples were taken and assayed for virus 
infectivity on the appropriate cell line. Four replicate samples were assayed at each time 
point. Virus survival at each time point was expressed as log10 (Nt/N0), where Nt is the 
virus concentration in MPN/mL at time t, and N0 is the initial virus concentration in 
MPN/mL in the positive control sample at time 0. 
Data analyses were carried out using Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corp.), and GraphPad 
Prism 5 (GraphPad, San Diego, CA). The parameter log10 (Nt/N0) versus time was used to 
perform regression analysis for each virus and water type. Coefficients from regression 
analysis were used to predict times needed for 90, 99, 99.9, and 99.99% reduction of each 
virus at each temperature. 
Recovery of MS2 from personal protective equipment 
Eluent comparison  
Virus stocks were diluted in 0.01M phosphate buffered saline to the desired 
concentration. Inocula for experiments were titered using the double agar layer (DAL) 
plaque assay on tryptic soy agar medium  using the host bacterium E. coli ATCC #15597  
(EPA, 2001b). Virus was applied to 4 cm2 swatches of contact isolation gown fabric in a 
single volume of 10µL. Swatches were held at room temperature in a biological safety 
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cabinet for 15 minutes, then immersed 250 mL sterile eluent solution. Eluent and PPE 
were agitated on a high-speed shaking platform for 20 minutes. Swatches were removed, 
eluent was expressed into the container by wringing, and the swatch was discarded. 
Eluent was diluted in tryptic soy broth (TSB) (Becton Dickinson) and assayed for MS2 
infectivity using DAL. 
Elution of viruses from personal protective equipment  
Virus stocks were diluted in 0.01M phosphate buffered saline to the desired 
concentration. For selected experiments, viruses diluted in PBS were monodispersed after 
dilution by sequential passage through hydrophilic polycarbonate filters with pore sizes 
of 0.2 µm (Isopore, Millipore, Billerica, MA) and 0.08 µm (Nuclepore track-etched 
membranes, Whatman, England)  pre-rinsed with 0.01% Tween 80 and sterile distilled 
water. Inocula for experiments were titered by DAL. Virus was applied to the surface of 
PPE in a single volume of 10µL. PPE items were held at room temperature in a biological 
safety cabinet for 15 minutes, then immersed in 1-2 L eluent solution (depending on size 
of item). Eluent and PPE were agitated on a reciprocal shaking platform at 120 
cycles/min for 20 minutes. PPE was removed and discarded, and eluent was assayed for 
infectious virus using a two-step enrichment procedure for MS2 (EPA, 2001a). 
Two-step enrichment method for MS2 infectivity assay 
Eluent samples were diluted as needed using additional sterile eluent. For enrichment, 
4M MgCl2 (12.5 mL/L) and 10X tryptic soy broth (50 mL/L) were added to the final 
dilutions. Appropriate dilutions were split into 10 replicate volumes per dilution, and log 
phase bacterial host (0.5 mL per tube), was added to each replicate volume. Enrichment 
samples were incubated for 24 hours at 37°C. Host bacterium cultures were also 
incubated at 37°C to check for contamination. For spot plates, 20 mL log phase bacterial 
 34 
host was added to 1L half-strength tryptic soy agar (30g tryptic soy broth, 7.5g bacto agar 
per liter) at 45°C and dispensed into 150 mm petri dishes. After incubation of enrichment 
samples, 10µL from each dilution replicate was placed on the surface of a spot plate and 
allowed to dry. Aliquots of host cultures were also placed on spot plates to check for viral 
contamination of host. Spot plates were incubated at 37°C for 24 hours. After incubation, 
dilution replicates were scored as positive or negative based on the presence or absence 
of lysis zones in or around the spots. Results for positive and negative spots were used to 
expressed concentrations as most probable number (MPN) of viruses per unit volume. 
Data Analysis  
Most probable number (MPN) calculations were done using the FDA Bacteriological 
Analytical Manual calculator (FDA, 2006). Data were analyzed using Excel 2003 
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA) and Graph Pad Prism 5 (Graph Pad, San Diego, CA) 
PPE experiments with human volunteers 
Selection of Inoculum Size  
In these experiments, the size of the inoculum used to contaminate PPE, including 
both the physical size of the inoculum used and the amount of virus contained in it, was 
chosen to approximate the characteristics of SARS virus inocula that might be naturally 
deposited on PPE during patient care. Because the main exposure route of concern in 
SARS transmission involves respiratory secretions, contamination of PPE might happen 
through patient activities such as coughing, or during droplet-producing patient care 
activities such as intubation. Therefore, experimental inoculum size and viral load should 
try to approximate that of respiratory secretions from humans infected with SARS. There 
are several reports in the literature on viral load in clinical specimens from SARS patients. 
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Most of these reports used quantitative RT-PCR methods, and viral loads are expressed in 
RNA copies/mL of sample. Wong et al. (2005) examined nasopharyngeal swabs of 
SARS patients and found that viral load ranged from 104 to 107 copies/mL, with a mean 
value of 107 copies/mL. Cheng et al. (2004) followed the pattern of viral shedding in 
SARS patients over time. They found that viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates peaked 
around day 12-14 of infection, at 105 copies/mL. Their findings are similar to Hung et al. 
(2004) who found that mean viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates around day 10–15 of 
infection was 105 copies/mL. This is lower than the range reported by Peiris et al. (2003), 
who found that peak viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates of SARS patients around day 
10 of infection ranged from 106 to 108 copies/mL. Estimates of the particle size of 
droplets expelled by people during activities such as breathing and coughing are difficult 
to find. One study of droplet size in the breath of healthy human subjects found that most 
droplets expelled are less than 1µm in size, and average about 83 droplets per liter of air 
expelled (Papineni and Rosenthal, 1997).  This suggests that the total volume of droplets 
expelled by a person during coughing may be quite small. Based on this, virus inocula 
should be applied to PPE in a small volume of liquid to simulate possible contamination 
by droplets expelled by an infected individual. A volume of 25 µL is small, but enough 
that the fluorescent tracer is still visible. If the viral load in patient exudates is 
approximately 107 per mL, a 25µL volume would contain ~104 viruses. Therefore, a virus 
inoculum of approximately 104 total PFU of MS2 in 25 µL was used for these 
experiments.  
Sample size calculations 
Sample size for human subjects experiments was determined using the rule of zero for 
the probability of viral transfer from PPE. This can be used for a study design in which n 
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subjects are run through the protocol with a selected challenge input of viruses. In this 
design, n subjects undergo an experiment in which PPE is contaminated with a challenge 
inoculum of 104 organisms. The outcome is detectable transfer of virus (to other pieces of 
PPE, clothing, face, or hands). By determining how many of n subjects transfer virus, the 
probability that a random healthcare worker, when presented with this challenge, will 
transfer virus can be determined.  
The confidence interval around this probability can also be determined. If, in a 
hypothetical experiment, it is found that none of the n subjects transfer any virus, it is 
known that the number of subjects who transfer virus is 0, and the probability that a 
random healthcare worker will transfer virus from PPE is 0. There is a distribution 
around this value, and the distribution has mean 0. The confidence interval around this 
mean of 0 can be calculated using the rule of zero, which says that for an experiment 
using n subjects, where 0 transfer virus, the upper bound of the 95% CI for the 
probability that a random healthcare worker, when presented with this challenge, will 
transfer virus is given by: 
Upper bound of 95% CI = 1−[exp(−2.9957/n)} 
 
In a hypothetical experiment, 0/10 subjects transfer virus. Therefore: 
1−[exp(-2.9957/10)}= 0.25 
So, using 10 subjects, the confidence interval for the probability that random 
healthcare worker, when presented with this challenge, will transfer virus is 0%–25%. 
Therefore, if 0 of 10 subjects transfer virus, the actual probability that transfer will take 
place could be as low as 0% or as high as 25%. As the number of subjects grows, the 
confidence interval shrinks.  For example, with 150 subjects, none of which transfer virus, 
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the upper limit of the confidence interval around the probability of zero is only 2%. Using 
25% as the a priori acceptable upper limit for this confidence interval, the number of 
subjects chosen for the initial challenge was n=10. 
Protocol for assessing transfer using human volunteers 
The protocol for human volunteer experiments is shown in Figure  2-1. Protocols were 
approved by the UNC Biomedical IRB and written informed consent was obtained from 
volunteer participants. Enrolled participants met the following inclusion criteria: over 18, 
non-pregnant, non-latex-allergic, no active skin disorders, and medical evaluation 
approval for N95 respirator fit testing and use (OSHA, 1998). Experiments took place in 
a patient care room in the UNC Hospitals’ General Clinical Research Center. Participants 
were shown the poster distributed by the CDC and given an opportunity to read it and ask 
questions. The poster was in front of the participant for reference while donning and 
removing PPE.  
PPE (gowns, gloves, respirators, and goggles) donned by volunteers was contaminated 
with bacteriophage MS2, a non-enveloped, non-pathogenic RNA virus suspended in 
0.01M PBS and GloGerm™ (GloGerm, Moab, UT), synthetic beads that fluoresce under 
ultraviolet light (for visual tracking of virus). Sites of contamination were: front shoulder 
of the gown, back shoulder of the gown, right side of the N95 respirator, upper right front 
of the goggles, and palm of the dominant hand. Each site was contaminated with a total 
of 104 plaque forming units (PFU) of MS2 in 5 drops of 5 µL each. Participants 
performed a healthcare task (measuring blood pressure on a mannequin) and then 
removed PPE according to the CDC protocol. Hands, items of PPE, and scrubs worn 
underneath were sampled for virus. Hands were sampled using the glove juice method 
(ASTM, 1994). Each hand was placed inside a bag containing 75 mL stripping solution 
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(0.4g KH2PO4, 10.1g Na2HPO4, 1.0 mL Triton-X /liter) and massaged for 60 seconds to 
cover all hand surfaces with solution. PPE items were immersed in 1.5% beef extract pH 
7.5 and agitated on a reciprocal shaking platform at 120 cycles/min for 20 minutes. 
Eluent from hands and PPE was assayed for MS2 by most probable number (MPN) two-
step enrichment method (EPA, 2001). To prevent cross-contamination, samples from 
only one volunteer were processed at a time, and individual eluent samples were 
processed separately in a biological safety cabinet, with decontamination in between. 
Removal of PPE (with CDC poster 
visible for reference at all times)
Scrubs and PPE placed in sterile eluent 
and transported to laboratory for 
analysis
PPE use Sampling
Examination of participant’s face and 
hands under UV light for the presence of 
tracer
Participant’s hands sampled using glove 
juice method
Participant’s hands cleaned with 
antimicrobial soap and 70% ethanol
Participant removed scrubs and 
showered to remove any virus/tracer
Scrubs and PPE collected and examined 
under UV light for presence of tracer
Put on scrub shirt and pants
Fit testing and instruction in how to put 
on and fit check N95 respirator
Donning of PPE (contact isolation gown, 
N95 respirator, goggles, gloves)
Virus/tracer placed on PPE
Performance of simulated healthcare task 
(Use of blood pressure cuff to take the 
blood pressure of a mannequin on an 
examination bed in the room, and 
counting of the pulse at the wrist)
 
Figure  2-1. Protocol for human volunteer experiments assessing viral transfer from PPE 
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Effect of temperature and humidity on survival of surrogate coronaviruses. 
Viral stocks were prepared as described above. Viral inocula were suspended in cell 
culture media to simulate the protein-containing matrices in which viruses may be 
deposited onto healthcare surfaces. Controlled humidity environments were created by 
the use of calcium sulfate granules (Drierite CO., Xenia, OH) or saturated salt solutions 
in sealed containers, and temperature and humidity were monitored using digital monitors. 
The test surfaces were 1 cm2 stainless steel carriers with a No. 4 polish. Carriers were 
prepared by washing in 0.01% Tween 80, rinsing in 70% ethanol followed by distilled 
water, and autoclaving. Virus sample volumes of 10µL were inoculated onto three 
replicate carriers for each time point and placed in the controlled humidity environment. 
At each time point, carriers were removed, placed in a well plate, and covered with 1 mL 
1.5% beef extract at pH 7.5. Viruses were eluted by gentle agitation at 60 RPM on a 
shaking platform for 20 minutes. The carrier was removed and the eluent assayed for 
infectivity on the appropriate cell line. Temperature and relative humidity conditions 
were: 
• 4°C and 20% RH (Drierite) 
• 4°C and 50% RH (saturated magnesium nitrate solution) 
• 4°C and 80% RH (saturated sodium chloride solution) 
• 20°C and 20% RH (Drierite) 
• 20°C and 50% RH (saturated magnesium nitrate solution) 
• 20°C and 80% RH (saturated ammonium chloride solution) 
• 40°C and 20% RH (Drierite) 
• 40°C and 50% RH (saturated magnesium nitrate solution) 
• 40°C and 80% RH (saturated sodium chloride solution) 
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Other test surfaces used were glazed ceramic tile, laminate (Formica), plastic 
(polypropylene), contact isolation gowns (MediPak, Winchester, VA), latex gloves 
(Evolution One, Microflex, Reno, NV), respirators (N95 1860 healthcare particulate 
respirator, 3M Co., St. Paul, MN), nitrile gloves, and hospital scrub fabric. Carriers were 
1 cm2 pieces of the test surfaces. Fabric carriers were boiled for 10 minutes in reagent-
grade water to remove any residual chemicals from laundering. Volumes of 10µL were 
inoculated onto three replicate carriers for each time point and placed in a controlled 
humidity environment at 20°C and 50% (±3%) to simulate the ambient conditions in 
healthcare environments. At each time point, carriers were removed, placed in a well 
plate, and covered with 1 mL 1.5% beef extract at pH 7.5. Viruses were eluted by gentle 
agitation at 60 RPM on a shaking platform for 20 minutes. The carrier was removed and 
the eluent assayed for virus infectivity on the appropriate cell line. Data analyses were 
carried out using Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corp.), and GraphPad Prism 5 (GraphPad, San 
Diego, CA). The parameter log10(Nt/N0) versus time was used to perform regression 
analysis on virus survival for each virus type, surface type, temperature, and relative 
humidity.
 CHAPTER 3 
Methods for the Recovery of a Model Virus from Healthcare 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Introduction 
Although nosocomial infections are a well-recognized risk for patients in many 
healthcare settings, healthcare workers are also affected. Caring for patients with 
communicable diseases places healthcare workers at risk for exposure to pathogens 
during patient care activities. Personal protective equipment (PPE) plays a crucial role in 
interrupting transmission of infectious bacterial and viral agents from patients to 
healthcare workers. PPE includes use of barriers (gowns, gloves, eye shields) and 
respiratory protection (masks, respirators) alone or in combination to protect mucous 
membranes, airways, skin, and clothing from contact with infectious agents (Siegel, 
2007).  
The importance of PPE in preventing healthcare worker infection was brought to the 
forefront by the worldwide outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The 
outbreak included a number of cases acquired by healthcare workers in the course of 
caring for SARS patients (Lau et al., 2004; McDonald et al., 2004), including medical 
students (Wong et al., 2004), nurses (Loeb et al., 2004), and emergency room personnel 
(Chen et al., 2004). Studies of the spread of SARS in healthcare environments established 
a crucial role for PPE in preventing the spread of SARS from patients to healthcare 
workers. 
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The spread of SARS in healthcare facilities also brought renewed attention to the 
question of whether viral diseases can spread from person to person via fomites in the 
healthcare environment, as SARS-CoV nucleic acids were recovered from hospital 
surfaces in outbreak settings (Dowell et al., 2004). Furniture and healthcare equipment 
are not the only fomites in healthcare environments that have the potential to spread 
viruses. During the performance of healthcare tasks, PPE may become contaminated by 
viable pathogenic microorganisms. These microorganisms may be shed in patients’ 
respiratory secretions, urine, or feces, or spread by contact, droplets, or aerosols from 
infected patients, and viruses can survive on the types of materials PPE is made from 
(Brady, Evans, and Cuartas, 1990, Bean et al., 1982).  Thus, PPE items are themselves  
types of fomites, and may play a role in the transmission of disease if they become 
contaminated with infectious viruses. This has been recognized by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) , which has a protocol outlining the proper 
sequence of removal of PPE items to minimize the risk of contamination to the wearer 
during removal (CDC, 2004).  
The fate of contaminating microorganisms when PPE is removed and disposed of has 
important consequences for infection control, and the possibility that PPE itself may be a 
fomite that contributes to the spread of viruses such as SARS remains a poorly 
understood area in need of additional research. In order to determine the dynamics of 
virus survival and transmission via contaminated PPE and the attendant health risks, 
levels of viral contamination need to be quantified. Methods are needed to quantitatively 
recover viruses from items of PPE, including contact isolation gowns, N95 respirators, 
gloves, and eye protection. We describe methods for recovering a model virus, 
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bacteriophage MS2, from PPE. MS2 is a non-pathogenic, non-enveloped single-stranded 
RNA virus. Many of the viruses that have been identified as important causes of 
nosocomial viral infection or have high potential for nosocomial transmission, such as 
SARS-CoV, influenza, parainfluenza, mumps, measles, respiratory syncytial virus, and 
noroviruses, are single stranded RNA viruses, making MS2 a promising surrogate for the 
recovery of these viruses from healthcare PPE.  
Materials and Methods 
Preparation of virus stocks  
Bacteriophage MS2 was propagated in the host bacterium E. coli C3000 (ATCC 
#15597) using the soft agar coliphage propagation method. Briefly, 50µL of virus stock 
was added to 30 mL of a log-phase host bacterial culture, grown on a rotating shaker for 
4 hours at 37°C, and purified by chloroform extraction using a 2:1 volume ratio of virus 
to chloroform followed by centrifugation (5900×g, 30 minutes, 4°C). “Soft” tryptic soy 
top agar was prepared by adding agar to tryptic soy broth at a final concentration of 0.7%, 
and bottom agar plates were prepared using full strength TSA in 150 mm petri dishes. 
Purified virus stock (0.5 mL) and log phase host culture (0.5 mL) were added to 30 mL of 
soft agar and dispensed into bottom agar plates. Plates were incubated at 37°C for 24 
hours. The top soft agar layer was then harvested with a pipette. Soft agar from all plates 
was pooled, purified by chloroform extraction as described above, and stored as stock in 
20% glycerol-tryptic soy broth at -80°C.  
Comparison of eluents for virus elution from PPE. 
 Virus stocks were diluted in 0.01M phosphate buffered saline, pH 7.2, to the desired 
concentration. Inocula for experiments were titered using the double agar layer (DAL) 
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plaque assay on tryptic soy agar (Becton Dickinson, Franklin Lakes, NJ) (EPA, 2001b). 
Virus was applied to 4 cm2 swatches of contact isolation gown fabric in a single drop 
containing 10µL. Swatches were held at room temperature in a biological safety cabinet 
for 15 minutes, then immersed 250 mL sterile eluent solution. Eluent and PPE were 
agitated on a reciprocal shaking platform at 120 cycles/min for 20 minutes. Swatches 
were removed and discarded, and eluent was diluted in tryptic soy broth (TSB) (Becton 
Dickinson) and assayed for MS2 by the DAL method. 
Elution of viruses from personal protective equipment  
Virus stocks were diluted in 0.01M phosphate buffered saline to the desired 
concentration. For selected experiments, viruses diluted in PBS were monodispersed after 
dilution by sequential passage through 0.2 and 0.08 µm pore size filters (Millipore, 
Billerica, MA) pre-rinsed successively with 0.01% Tween 80 and sterile distilled water. 
Inocula for experiments were titered by DAL. Virus was applied to the surface of PPE in 
a single volume of 10µL. PPE items were held at room temperature in a biological safety 
cabinet for 15 minutes, and then immersed in 1-2 L eluent solution (depending on size of 
item). Eluent and PPE were agitated on a reciprocal shaking platform at 120 cycles/min 
for 20 minutes. PPE was removed from the eluent, the additional eluent was expressed 
into the container by wringing, and the item was discarded. The eluent was assayed for 
infectious virus using a two-step enrichment procedure for MS2 (EPA, 2001a). 
PPE worn by human volunteers  
Protocols for human volunteer experiments were approved by the UNC Biomedical 
IRB and written informed consent was obtained. Enrolled participants met the following 
inclusion criteria: over 18 years of age, non-pregnant, non-latex-allergic, no active skin 
disorders, and medical evaluation approval for N95 respirator fit testing and use. 
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Experiments took place in a patient care room in the UNC Hospitals’ General Clinical 
Research Center. Volunteers donned contact isolation gowns (MediChoice, Arden, NC), 
gloves (Evolution One, Microflex, Reno, NV), respirators (N95 1860 healthcare 
particulate respirator, 3M Co., St. Paul, MN) and splashproof plastic goggles 
(Monogoggle, American Allsafe, Tonawanda, NY). Items of PPE were then 
contaminated with MS2 suspended in 0.01M PBS and with GloGerm™ (GloGerm, Moab, 
UT), synthetic beads that fluoresce under ultraviolet light (for visual tracking of virus). 
Sites of contamination were: front shoulder of the gown, back shoulder of the gown, right 
side of the N95 respirator, upper right front of the goggles, and palm of the dominant 
hand. Each site was contaminated with a total of 104 plaque forming units (PFU) of MS2, 
in with 5 drops of 5 µL each. Participants simulated a routine healthcare task by 
measuring blood pressure on a mannequin and then removed PPE. Gowns, N95 
respirators, gloves, and goggles were collected after removal, immersed in eluent solution, 
and transported immediately back to the laboratory for analysis. Eluent and PPE were 
agitated on a reciprocal shaking platform at 120 cycles/min for 20 minutes. PPE was 
removed from the eluent, the additional eluent was expressed into the container by 
wringing, and the item was discarded. Eluent was assayed for infectious virus using the 
two-step enrichment method. 
Two-step enrichment method 
 Eluent samples were diluted as needed using additional sterile eluent. For enrichment, 
4M MgCl2 (12.5 mL/L) and 10X tryptic soy broth were added to the final sample 
dilutions at a 1:20 (V/V) ratio of broth to sample. Appropriate dilutions were split into 10 
replicate volumes per dilution, and 0.5 mL of log phase bacterial host was added to each 
replicate volume. Enrichment samples were incubated for 24 hours at 37°C. Host 
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bacterium cultures were also incubated at 37°C to check for contamination. For spot 
plates, 20 mL log phase bacterial host was added to 1L half-strength tryptic soy molten 
agar (30g tryptic soy broth, 7.5g Bacto agar per liter) at 45°C and dispensed into 150 mm 
petri dishes. After incubation of enrichment samples, 10µL from each dilution replicate 
was placed on the surface of a spot plate and allowed to dry. Aliquots of bacterial host 
cultures were also placed on spot plates to check for viral contamination of host. Spot 
plates were incubated at 37°C for 24 hours. After incubation, dilution replicates were 
scored as positive or negative based on the presence or absence of lysis zones within or 
around the spots. Results of positive and negative enrichment-spot plate volumes were 
expressed as most probable number (MPN) of viruses per unit volume of sample. 
Data Analysis  
Most probable number calculations were done using the FDA Bacteriological 
Analytical Manual calculator (FDA, 2006). Data on virus recoveries were statistically 
analyzed using Excel 2003 (Microsoft, Redmond, WA) and Graph Pad Prism 5 (Graph 
Pad, San Diego, CA) 
Results  
In the first phase, nine candidate eluent solutions were compared for their efficiency in 
eluting 5.8 log10 virus from 4 cm2 swatches of contact isolation gown material. Beef 
extract was chosen based on its efficacy in recovering viruses from surfaces in other 
applications, such as ionically charged filters (Polaczyk, Roberts, and Hill, 2007). The 
effects of beef extract concentration (1.5% vs. 3%), pH (7.5 vs. 9.0), and the addition of 
0.1% Tween 80, a detergent, were evaluated. PBS with 0.1% Tween 80 was also used to 
evaluate the effect of detergent alone. Virus stocks used in these initial experiments were 
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not monodispersed. Eluent samples were assayed by DAL. Virus recoveries using each 
eluent are shown in Table  3-1 and Figure  3-1.  
Table  3-1. Evaluation of candidate eluents for recovery of MS2 from swatches of contact isolation 
gown material (original inoculum 5.8 log10 PFU)† 
 
Eluent % recovery (st. dev) 
1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 73.0 (37.9) 
1.5% beef extract pH 9.0 67.8 (49.2) 
3% beef extract pH 7.5 63.9 (44.4) 
3% beef extract pH 9.0 60.7 (41.8) 
1.5% beef extract pH 7.5+ 0.1% Tween 80 52.5 (36.2) 
1.5% beef extract pH 9.0+0.1% Tween 80 21.0 (24.1) 
3% beef extract pH 7.5+0.1% Tween 80 20.1 (9.6) 
3% beef extract pH 9.0+0.1% Tween 80 17.1 (14.2) 
PBS+0.1% Tween 80 14.7 (8.7) 
† average of 4 trials 
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Figure  3-1. Evaluation of candidate eluents for recovery of MS2 from swatches of contact isolation 
gown material (average of 4 trials; dashed line: original inoculum 5.8 log10 PFU; bars: 95% CI) 
 
No significant difference was found in recoveries from any of the nine eluents using 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) (p=0.14). Four eluents with the highest mean 
recovery were then tested for their efficiency in eluting low numbers of virus (1.8 log10 
PFU) from contact isolation gown swatches. To maximize recovery of low numbers of 
virus, the entire volume of eluent was examined using the two-step enrichment method. 
The results are shown in Figure  3-2.  
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Figure  3-2. Evaluation of candidate eluents for recovery of MS2 from swatches of contact isolation 
gown material (average of 4 trials; dashed line: original inoculum 1.8 log10 PFU; bars: 95% CI) 
 
The two eluents with the highest mean recovery, 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 (mean 1.3 
log10 MPN) and PBS+0.1% Tween 80 (mean 1.25 log10 MPN), did not differ 
significantly (unpaired t test, p=0.59). The solution with the simplest composition, 1.5% 
beef extract at pH 7.5, was chosen for subsequent experiments. This eluent was evaluated 
for its efficiency in eluting low numbers of MS2 (1.5 log10 PFU) from multiple PPE items 
using two-step enrichment assays of recovered elution fluid. PPE items tested were 4 cm2 
swatches of contact isolation gown fabric, whole contact isolation gowns, whole N95 
respirators, splashproof goggles, and whole latex gloves. Gown swatches were immersed 
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in 250 mL eluent. PPE items were immersed in 1-2 L of eluent, depending on the size of 
the item. Results are shown in Figure  3-3.  
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Figure  3-3. Recovery of MS2 from PPE using 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 (dashed line: original 
inoculum 1.5 log10 PFU; bars: 95% CI) 
 
Recovery from multiple PPE types using this eluent was variable, and was 
significantly greater than the inoculum titer. It was hypothesized that this was a result of 
viruses in the inoculum existing as aggregates. The titer of viruses existing in an 
aggregated state can be underestimated by plaque count methods due to single plaques 
being formed by an aggregate consisting of multiple viruses (Teunis, 2005). Protein 
solutions such as beef extract can disrupt aggregates formed by viruses (Gerba, 1984). If 
aggregated viruses in the inoculum were subsequently dispersed by the beef extract 
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eluent, the titer of virus recovered from the eluent would be higher than that of the 
inoculum. In an effort to address this problem, viruses in subsequent experiments were 
monodispersed by sequential filtration before being inoculated onto PPE. To evaluate the 
effect of dispersion, monodispersed MS2 was inoculated onto multiple PPE types in 
amounts of 1.5, 2.5, or 4.6 log10 PFU and eluted as described above. As seen in Figure 
 3-4, when virus is dispersed, the titer of virus recovered from gowns  and other PPE types 
does not differ significantly (using unpaired t-test) from the inoculum titer, indicating that 
monodispersion of viral inocula prior to application is necessary to accurately measure 
viral recovery from experimentally contaminated PPE materials. 
 
  
Figure  3-4. (a) Recovery of monodispersed MS2 from contact isolation gowns using 1.5% beef extract 
pH 7.5 (3 trials; bar: 95% CI) (b) Recovery of monodispersed MS2 from multiple PPE types using 
1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 (2 trials; dashed line: inoculum 4.6 log10 PFU) 
 
Based on the results of these experiments, two-step enrichment using beef extract 
eluent was then applied to items of PPE that underwent simulated viral contamination 
while being worn by human volunteers during a routine healthcare task. Ten subjects put 
on gowns, N95 respirators, gloves, and goggles, which were then contaminated with 4.3 
log10 PFU of monodispersed MS2 (see Materials and Methods). After a volunteer took a 
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blood pressure on a mannequin to simulate a routine task that might be performed while 
wearing PPE, their PPE was removed and analyzed for recovery of MS2.  
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Figure  3-5. Recovery of MS2 from PPE worn by human volunteers during healthcare tasks (10 trials; 
dashed line: inoculum 4.6 log10 PFU; bars: 95% CI) 
 
As shown in Figure  3-5, elution with 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 followed by two-step 
enrichment assay can efficiently recover infectious MS2 from contaminated PPE that has 
been worn during the performance of a healthcare task. Recovery did not differ 
significantly among PPE types (one-way ANOVA, p=0.98). 
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Discussion 
There are still knowledge gaps in assessing the risk of viral disease transmission posed 
by handling contaminated PPE. Accurate measurement of levels of viral contamination 
and the extent of viral survival on PPE items is vital information for such risk 
assessments. The existing literature on viral survival on PPE encompasses only some 
materials, and studies use a variety of methods to recover viruses from test materials, 
making comparisons between studies difficult. Different methods for viral recovery may 
have different recovery efficiencies, especially if the method was not specifically 
developed for the recovery of viruses. Viruses deposited on PPE in matrices of urine, 
feces, and respiratory secretions will likely be within a matrix consisting of water, salts 
and organic molecules. Viruses in such matrices behave as colloids, and their attachment 
to surfaces is largely governed by electrostatic and Van der Waals interactions with other 
molecules and surfaces (Gerba, 1984). These relationships at the molecular level may 
help to explain attachment of viruses to materials used in PPE as well; PPE items are 
often made of synthetic polymers that have different surface properties with respect to 
type and magnitude of charge and hydrophobic-hydrophilic properties. Examples are 
listed in Table  3-2. 
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Table  3-2. Characteristics of materials used in PPE 
PPE Materials Polymer structure Charge properties 
Contact isolation gowns 
(Ellis, 2005) 
polypropylene, 
polyethylene 
carbon and hydrogen hydrophobic 
Eye protection polyvinyl chloride chlorine molecules polar groups 
 Polycarbonate oxygen molecules polar groups 
Gloves latex vinyl acetate, styrene-
butadiene, acrylates 
polar or nonpolar groups 
 polyvinyl chloride chlorine molecule polar groups 
 polyurethane oxygen molecules polar groups 
 nitrile nitrile groups polar groups 
N95 respirator microfibers electrostatically charged polar groups 
 
As seen in Table 2, PPE can be made of molecules with both charged and hydrophobic 
characteristics. The lipid or protein outer coats of viruses have a net positive or negative 
surface charge depending on the pH of their surrounding environment; in neutral pH 
environments they tend to be negative. However, the protein coats of non-enveloped 
viruses can have pockets of hydrophobicity, and enveloped viruses have hydrophobic 
lipid membranes (Gerba, 1984). Therefore, virus attachment to PPE may be mediated by 
electrostatic interactions, when charged viral surfaces encounter charged groups on PPE 
surfaces, with the exact relationship depending on the pH of the surrounding matrix. It 
can also be mediated by hydrophobic reactions, when hydrophobic molecules on the 
surface of both viruses and PPE are excluded by the surrounding water molecules. 
Methods to elute viruses from PPE materials can be designed to disrupt these interactions. 
Robust and efficient virus recovery methods based on altering the adsorption and 
attachment behavior of viruses in contact with surfaces have been developed for eluting 
viruses from charged filter media using protein solutions (Polaczyk, Roberts, and Hill, 
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2007). Molecules in proteinaceous eluents have a variety of surface charges, and compete 
with viruses for attachment and adsorption sites on surfaces (Gerba, 1984).  
This study demonstrated that a protein-based eluent, beef extract, is effective for 
eluting viruses from a range of PPE materials, possibly due to the disruption of both 
charged and hydrophobic interactions between the virus and the surface. Beef extract 
may also be efficacious for the elution of other types of viruses from PPE, including 
enveloped viruses, but this topic needs further research. 
These virus recovery methods can be used to expand our knowledge of viral survival 
on PPE. To date, there have been few studies assessing the survival of pathogens on 
materials used to make personal protective equipment (Yassi et al., 2005). Although there 
have been studies of bacterial survival on N95 respirators (Wang, 1999), no such studies 
exist for viruses. Some investigations have found that viruses can survive on materials 
used to make other types of PPE. When deposited in high numbers (~106 TCID50), 
SARS-CoV has been found to survive on gowns for up to 2 days (Lai, Cheng, and Lim, 
2005). Enveloped ssRNA viruses have been shown to survive on latex glove material.  
For example, human coronavirus 229E can survive for up to 2 hours, although it loses up 
to 85% of its infectious titer (Sizun et al., 2000), and avian influenza virus can survive for 
up to 6 days without loss of infectious titer (Tiwari et al., 2005). Non-enveloped RNA 
viruses such as human rotavirus and hepatitis A virus can survive for several days on 
latex under ambient conditions, with only ~1 log10 loss in infectious titer (Abad, Pinto, 
and Bosch, 1994). Viruses deposited on PPE are likely to be associated with respiratory 
secretions, urine, or feces, and viruses, which may enhance viral survival. SARS Co-V, 
for example, can retain its infectivity for hours in feces and days in respiratory secretions 
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(Lai, Cheng, and Lim, 2005). These existing studies suggest that viruses have the 
potential to survive on PPE materials for longer than single-use PPE is usually worn, 
creating the potential for viral transfer when PPE is handled after wearing. Pittet et al 
(2006) described five steps necessary for pathogens to be transferred from patient to 
patient via healthcare workers’ hands (Figure  3-6): 
 
Figure  3-6. Sequence of events for transfer of pathogens from patient to patient via healthcare 
workers' hands (from Pittet et al., 2006). 
 
Contaminated PPE can play a role in steps 1-2. If patients shed viruses onto healthcare 
workers’ PPE in the course of patient care, these viruses can remain infectious when PPE 
Organisms are present on the patient's skin or 
have been shed onto inanimate objects 
immediately surrounding the patient 
Organisms must be transferred to the hands 
of health-care workers. 
Organisms must be capable of surviving for 
at least several minutes on health-care 
workers' hands. 
Healthcare worker hand hygiene must be 
inadequate or absent, or the agent used for 
hand hygiene inappropriate. 
The contaminated hand(s) of the caregiver 
must come into direct contact with another 
patient or with an inanimate object that will 
come into direct contact with the patient 
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is removed. Transfer of viruses from experimentally contaminated fabrics (Rusin, 
Maxwell, and Gerba, 2002), plastic surfaces (Gwaltney and Hendley, 1982), and gloves 
(Hall, Douglas, and Geiman, 1980) to hands has been demonstrated, suggesting that 
viruses can transfer from PPE to hands when contaminated items are handled in the 
course of removal and disposal. In addition, contamination can be present on skin after 
exposure to pathogens even when PPE is worn (Zamora et al., 2006), and may be 
transferred to used items of PPE if they are handled after removal. Virus transfer between 
hands and PPE items can encourage both accidental autoinoculation by the healthcare 
worker and subsequent transmission of viruses to other patients, staff, or family members, 
especially when inadequate hand hygiene is practiced (Pittet et al., 2006).  
Viral contamination of PPE items also has important implications if PPE is reused. 
Availability of PPE is recognized as an important factor affecting proper use (Moore et 
al., 2005). Although reuse of disposable PPE for multiple patient encounters is not 
recommended (Siegel et al., 2007), there may be situations in which PPE is in short 
supply and reuse is difficult to avoid. Reuse could be a serious concern in outbreak 
settings with high patient loads, or in low-resource settings where the cost of single-use 
disposable PPE is prohibitive. Reuse of PPE such as gloves, though discouraged (WHO, 
2006) takes place in under-resourced healthcare settings (Gunasekera et al., 1997; 
Mbanya, Ateudjieu, and Kaptue, 1998). During the SARS outbreak, there may have been 
shortages of PPE items in some facilities (Farquharson and Baguley, 2003; Lau et al., 
2004; Lee, Wee, and Johan, 2005; McDonald et al., 2004); under these circumstances, 
items of PPE may be reused for multiple patient encounters (Shaw, 2006). If PPE is used, 
handled, and reused during multiple patient encounters, there are many potential 
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opportunities for the spread of viruses from contaminated items to the face, hands, and 
body of the user, as well as from patient to patient via the healthcare worker. Robust 
methods to measure viral contamination on PPE items can be applied to more accurately 
assess these and other microbial risks of PPE removal, handling and reuse in all 
healthcare settings. The methods described here are the first that have been shown to give 
high virus recovery with multiple types of PPE. These methods can be used to conduct 
rigorous studies of viral survival on PPE and virus transfer to and from PPE for risk 
assessments in infection control and healthcare worker protection. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
Assessing the Risk of Viral Transfer from  
Contaminated Personal Protective Equipment to Employees’ 
Skin and Clothing in the Healthcare Setting 
Introduction 
Caring for patients with communicable diseases places healthcare workers (HCWs) at 
risk. Infected HCWs may suffer serious illness or death, and may spread infection to 
other HCWs, their families, or patients. Methods to prevent HCW infections include 
vaccination (CDC, 1997; Weber and Rutala, 2008), hand hygiene (Boyce and Pittet, 
2002), and isolation of patients with communicable diseases (Siegel et al., 2007).  
A key aspect of patient isolation is proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
to protect HCWs from pathogen exposure during patient care. PPE includes use of 
barriers (gowns, gloves, eye shields) and respiratory protection (masks, respirators) to 
protect mucous membranes, airways, skin, and clothing from contact with infectious 
agents (Siegel et al., 2007). The importance of PPE was underscored in the outbreak of 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). HCWs, accounted for approximately 20% 
of cases, and developed SARS while performing patient care (Chan-Yeung et al., 2004, 
Lau et al., 2004a). Studies demonstrated that failure to properly use PPE was a risk factor 
for HCW infection (Lau et al., 2004b). 
This outbreak raised concern that HCWs could contaminate their skin or clothes with 
pathogens during PPE removal, resulting in accidental self-inoculation as well as 
subsequent virus spread to patients, other HCWs, or fomites. The Centers for Disease 
 63 
Control and Prevention (CDC) addressed this by designing a protocol to minimize wearer 
contamination during the PPE removal process (Figure  4-1) (CDC, 2004). However, the 
effectiveness of this protocol in preventing self-contamination has not been validated. 
 
Figure  4-1. CDC protocol for removing healthcare worker PPE 
 
By examining the fate of viruses after removal of experimentally contaminated PPE 
under controlled conditions, it can be determined if removing PPE according to the CDC 
protocol prevents viral contamination of the wearer. A human challenge study was 
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undertaken using a non-pathogenic virus to determine the fate of viruses on items of PPE 
when a wearer removes PPE in accordance with the CDC protocol.  
Methods 
PPE (gowns, gloves, respirators, and goggles) donned by volunteers was contaminated 
with bacteriophage MS2, a non-enveloped, non-pathogenic RNA virus suspended in 
0.01M PBS and GloGerm™ (GloGerm, Moab, UT), synthetic beads that fluoresce under 
ultraviolet light (for visual tracking of virus). Sites of contamination were: front shoulder 
of the gown, back shoulder of the gown, right side of the N95 respirator, upper right front 
of the goggles, and palm of the dominant hand. Each site was contaminated with a total 
of 104 plaque forming units (PFU) of MS2 in 5 drops of 5 µL each. Participants 
performed a healthcare task (measuring blood pressure on a mannequin) and then 
removed PPE according to the CDC protocol. Hands, items of PPE, and scrubs worn 
underneath were sampled for virus. Hands were sampled using the glove juice method 
(American Society for Testing and Materials, 1994). Each hand was placed inside a bag 
containing 75 mL stripping solution (0.4g KH2PO4, 10.1g Na2HPO4, 1.0 mL Triton-X 
/liter) and massaged for 60 seconds to cover all hand surfaces with solution. PPE items 
were immersed in 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 and agitated on a shaker for 20 minutes. 
Eluent from hands and PPE was assayed by most probable number (MPN) enrichment 
infectivity assay (EPA, 2001). To prevent cross-contamination, samples from only one 
volunteer were processed at a time, and individual eluent samples were processed 
separately in a biological safety cabinet, with decontamination in between. 
Using an a priori value of 25% for the 95% upper confidence limit when p(transfer)=0, 
the sample size was n=10. Protocols were approved by the UNC Biomedical IRB and 
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written informed consent was obtained. Enrolled participants met the inclusion criteria: 
over 18, non-pregnant, non-latex-allergic, no active skin disorders, and medical 
evaluation approval for N95 respirator fit testing and use (OSHA, 1998). Experiments 
took place in a patient care room in the UNC Hospitals’ General Clinical Research Center. 
The experimental protocol is shown in Figure  4-2. Participants were shown the poster 
distributed by the CDC (Figure  4-1) and given an opportunity to read it and ask questions. 
The poster was in front of the participant for reference while donning and removing PPE.  
Removal of PPE (with CDC poster 
visible for reference at all times)
Scrubs and PPE placed in sterile eluent 
and transported to laboratory for 
analysis
PPE use Sampling
Examination of participant’s face and 
hands under UV light for the presence of 
tracer
Participant’s hands sampled using glove 
juice method
Participant’s hands cleaned with 
antimicrobial soap and 70% ethanol
Participant removed scrubs and 
showered to remove any virus/tracer
Scrubs and PPE collected and examined 
under UV light for presence of tracer
Put on scrub shirt and pants
Fit testing and instruction in how to put 
on and fit check N95 respirator
Donning of PPE (contact isolation gown, 
N95 respirator, goggles, gloves)
Virus/tracer placed on PPE
Performance of simulated healthcare task 
(Use of blood pressure cuff to take the 
blood pressure of a mannequin on an 
examination bed in the room, and 
counting of the pulse at the wrist)
 
Figure  4-2. Protocol for human challenge experiments 
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Results 
Ten subjects participated in this study; nine females and one male.  Nine subjects were 
right-handed and one left-handed. Transfer of virus to both hands, the initially 
uncontaminated glove on the non-dominant hand, and the scrub shirt and pants worn 
underneath the PPE was observed in most volunteers (Table  4-1). Due to the difficulty of 
sampling large facial areas, the presence of visible fluorescent tracer was used as the 
criterion to determine whether the face would be sampled. No tracer was observed on the 
facial areas of any volunteer. The fluorescent tracer was not a consistent indicator of 
virus contamination, with virus recovered both from sites where tracer was visible and 
where it was not detected. 
Table  4-1. Frequency and Levels of Viral Contamination of Selected Sites 
Site Percent of volunteers 
who transferred virus to 
site (N=10) 
Mean viral titer 
recovered from site 
(log10 MPN) 
Proportion of 
contaminated sites with 
visible tracer (N=10) 
Non-dominant glove   80% 2.2 10% 
Right hand (skin)   90% 2.4 20% 
Left hand (skin)   70% 1.8   0% 
Scrub shirt 100% 3.2 10% 
Scrub pants   75%* 2.1   0% 
Face     0% -- -- 
*N=8 
 
The amount of virus recovered ranged from 1-3 log10 MPN for hands and 1-4 log10 
MPN for scrubs. The mean amount of virus recovered from the right hand (the dominant 
hand of 9/10 volunteers) was greater than that recovered from the left hand. While 
removal of gloves and gowns required two hands, mask and goggle removal was one-
handed, which could have resulted in larger quantities of virus transferred to the 
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dominant hand during removal. In the single left-handed subject, recovery of virus was 
greater from the left hand than the right (1.82 vs. 0.98 log10 MPN). The mean amount of 
virus recovered from scrub shirts was significantly greater than that recovered from pants 
(p=0.01), possibly due to contact with hands when the gown is pulled away from the 
shoulder during removal. 
Discussion 
PPE is vital for protecting HCWs from occupationally acquired infection during 
patient care, particularly droplet- or airborne-transmitted diseases (Weber and Rutala, 
2008). However, removing PPE after patient care without contaminating skin or clothes 
is important. PPE is usually worn only for short periods, while viruses such as influenza 
(Bean et al., 1982) and SARS-CoV (Rabenau et al., 2005) can survive for hours on 
surfaces, and viral infection can be spread by surface-to-hand (Gwaltney and Hendley, 
1982) and hand-to-hand contact (Gwaltney et al., 1978).  
Developing and validating an algorithm for the removal of PPE that prevents 
contamination of the skin and clothes of HCWs is key to interrupting nosocomial 
transmission of potentially serious infectious agents, including SARS, avian influenza, 
hemorrhagic viruses and poxviruses. These experiments showing viral transfer 
demonstrate that the current CDC algorithm is insufficient to protect HCWs from 
contamination during PPE removal, but several potential options exist that might prevent 
such contamination, including double gloving, use of surgical protocols for PPE removal, 
and PPE impregnated with an antimicrobial agent.  
A double glove removal sequence would begin with removal of the outer glove, 
followed by goggles or face shield, gown, and respirator/mask, and finishing with 
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removal of the inner glove followed by hand hygiene. Using this method, handling of 
PPE with ungloved hands is avoided. The use of an inner glove ½ size larger than usually 
worn may be used to improve dexterity and reduce constriction when double gloving. 
Borrowing PPE protocols from surgery, where the ends of gown sleeves are tucked 
underneath gloves during wear, might also reduce contamination. When finished, goggles 
and respirator are removed first, and gown and gloves are then removed together by 
peeling off both at the same time, again avoiding handling PPE with ungloved hands. 
Finally, the use of PPE impregnated with  antimicrobial agents might also reduce or 
eliminate contamination of skin and clothes.  
This study also indicates the need for continued emphasis on hand hygiene. A barrier 
to improving hand hygiene compliance rates is the belief that gloves make hand hygiene 
unnecessary (Pittet et al., 2001). This is contradicted by our study and others showing 
that organisms can spread from gloves to hands after glove removal (Doebbeling, et al., 
1988). Even if double gloving is incorporated into protocols for PPE use, it is vital to 
emphasize that it is not a substitute for proper hand hygiene. Before these or other 
candidate methods are introduced into clinical practice, their impact on the safety of 
HCWs should be validated by testing using methods such as we have described.   
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 CHAPTER 5 
Survival of Surrogate Coronaviruses in Water 
Introduction 
Members of the family Coronaviridae have been recognized for many years as a cause 
of common-cold like, self-limiting respiratory infections in humans (Monto, 1997). With 
the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in a worldwide outbreak 
in 2003, there was new recognition that coronavirus infection could result in serious, 
even fatal disease. The agent of SARS was quickly found to be a previously 
unrecognized coronavirus, named SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (Drosten et al., 2003). 
In the age of global travel, large healthcare facilities, and high density housing 
developments, SARS CoV was novel not only because it was a newly emerged human 
pathogen of the Coronaviridae family, but for the routes by which it appeared to spread 
in human populations. A respiratory pathogen transmitted from person-to-person by 
droplets and aerosols, SARS-CoV spread from patients to healthcare workers in 
emergency rooms and other healthcare facilities (Chen et al., 2004, Seto et al., 2003), 
from  patients to visitors in a hospital (Varia et al., 2003), and from passenger to 
passenger on an airplane (Olsen et al., 2003). When an outbreak of SARS occurred in 
Amoy Gardens, a large apartment complex in Hong Kong, it was found that SARS-CoV 
shed in the feces an infected individual visiting one of the buildings may have spread via 
viral aerosols that entered the bathrooms of other apartments through faulty toilet 
plumbing and floor drains, transmitting SARS to other occupants of the building 
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(McKinney et al., 2006). Because of this unique fecal-droplet-respiratory route, it is 
possible that during outbreaks, water contaminated with the fecal waste of infected 
individuals becomes subsequently aerosolized to possibly serve as a vehicle of 
transmission for SARS. In order to better assess the risks from this exposure pathway, 
data are needed on the survival and persistence of SARS-CoV in water and sewage. If 
SARS-CoV is found to be capable of surviving for relatively long periods of time in 
water, a droplet route of exposure and transmission would be supported as plausible. 
Because SARS requires specially trained personnel working in BSL-3 laboratory 
containment, there are significant challenges involved in gathering such data, and very 
little data are currently available. However, other members of the Coronaviridae family 
may provide representative survival data  that can be used to conduct risk assessments of 
SARS. In order to determine the survival and persistence of coronavirus infectivity in 
water and sewage over time, two animal coronaviruses  were studied for survival in 
different water types at two ambient temperatures as possible surrogates for the survival 
of SARS-CoV.  
The family Coronaviridae is divided into three groups. Groups I and II include human, 
mammalian, and avian coronaviruses, and Group III consists of avian coronaviruses. 
Although SARS is thought to be related to the Group 2 coronaviruses (Jackwood, 2006), 
and phylogenetic analyses have indicated it may be closely related to mouse hepatitis 
virus (MHV) (Lio and Goldman, 2004), there is still disagreement about the exact 
placement of SARS-CoV within the coronavirus family (Gorbalenya, Snijder and Spaan, 
2004). Based on this uncertainty, one representative of each group of mammalian 
coronaviruses was included in the study to determin
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persistence in water. The two viruses studied were transmissible gastroenteritis virus 
(TGEV), a diarrheal pathogen of swine and a member of the Group I coronaviruses, and  
mouse hepatitis virus (MHV), a pathogen of laboratory mice and a member of the Group 
II coronaviruses (Jackwood, 2006). The survival of these two viruses in reagent-grade 
water, lake water, and settled human sewage was observed over a period of weeks to 
provide estimates of how long members of the coronavirus family, as surrogates of 
SARS-CoV, may remain infectious in these waters.  
Materials and methods 
Test waters 
Reagent-grade water was produced from laboratory tap water by a Dracor™ water 
purification system (Dracor, Durham, NC) which includes reverse osmosis and ultraviolet 
light treatment. Lake water came from University Lake, an impoundment that serves as 
the drinking water source for the town of Chapel Hill, NC ,and was obtained from the 
raw water inlet of the Orange Water and Sewer Authority (OWASA) drinking water 
treatment plant. Settled sewage was obtained from the OWASA waste water reclamation 
facility, and was pasteurized in a waterbath at 70°C for 3 hours to inactivate other 
microorganisms that would interfere with cell culture infectivity assays of coronaviruses. 
Preparation of viral stocks 
TGEV and MHV were kindly provided by R. Baric, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill. TGEV was grown in swine testicular (ST) cell cultures. MHV was grown in 
delayed brain tumor (DBT) cell cultures. Viral stocks were propagated by infecting 
confluent layers of host cell cultures in flasks, harvesting cell lysates, clarifying by 
centrifugation (3000×g, 30 min, 4°C), and storing resulting supernatants as virus stock at 
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-80°C. Viral titers were determined by quantal assays for CPE and expressed as the most 
probable number (MPN) method. Assays were in confluent host cell layers in 24-well 
plates containing maintenance medium consisting of Eagle’s  minimum essential medium 
(MEM), 10% bovine serum replacement (Fetal Clone II, Hyclone, Logan, UT), 10% 
lactalbumin hydrolysate and gentamicin (0.1 mg/mL)/kanamycin (0.05 mg/mL) and 
nystatin (75 U/mL). 
Survival experiments 
For each virus, 5 mL of clarified virus stock was spiked into duplicate 45 mL aliquots 
of test water. A positive control sample for measuring the initial virus concentration in 
water at time 0 was taken and assayed immediately after spiking. One aliquot of test 
water was held at room temperature (23-25°C), and another one was held at refrigerator 
temperature (4°C). At each time point, samples were taken and assayed for virus 
infectivity on the appropriate host cell line. Four replicate samples were assayed at each 
time point. Virus survival at each time point was expressed as log10 (Nt/N0), where Nt is 
the virus concentration in MPN/mL at time t, and N0 is the initial virus concentration in 
MPN/mL in the positive control sample at time 0. 
Statistical Analysis 
Analysis was carried out using Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corp.), and GraphPad Prism 5 
(GraphPad, San Diego, CA). The parameter log10(Nt/N0) versus time was used to perform 
regression analysis for each virus and water type. Coefficients from regression analysis 
were used to predict times needed for 90, 99, 99.9, and 99.99% reduction of each virus at 
each temperature in test waters. 
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Results 
The change in infectious titer of TGEV and MHV in reagent-grade water (pH 6.0, 
turbidity 0.6 NTU) over 49 days at 4°C and 25°C is summarized in Figure  5-1 (a) and (b). 
Observed viral reduction values are plotted as individual data points. Predicted viral 
reduction values obtained from regression analysis are plotted as lines (MHV, black lines, 
TGEV, gray lines). There was a progressive decline in the infectivity of both TGEV and 
MHV over 49 days at 25°C, and the reduction in infectivity of both viruses at 25°C 
follows typical first-order kinetics (Fig 1a). Reductions of both viruses at 25°C as 
determined by regression analysis (as log10 Nt/N0) are shown in Table  5-1.  
Table  5-1. Reduction of TGEV and MHV infectivity (log10 Nt/N0) in reagent-grade water at 25°C 
Day TGEV MHV 
0 0 0 
7 -0.6 -0.8 
14 -1.2 -1.6 
19 -1.7 -2.2 
29 -2.6 -3.3 
43 -3.8 -4.8 
49 -4.4 -5.5 
 
The infectivity of TGEV declined by approximately 0.6 log10 per week, and infectious 
MHV declined by approximately 0.8 log10 per week. Times for 99% reduction in 
infectious titer in RGW at 25°C was 22 days for TGEV and 17 days for MHV. 
Comparison of regression lines at 25°C for TGEV and MHV showed a significant 
difference in inactivation rates between the two viruses at this temperature (p<0.001). As 
shown in Figure  5-1(b), there was no significant decline in infectious titer of either virus 
over 49 days at 4°C.  
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Figure  5-1. Infectivity of TGEV and MHV log10 (Nt/N0) over 49 days in reagent-grade water, 4 trials 
per plotted time point. Observed data=individual points; predicted values from regression 
analysis=continuous lines. (a) Infectivity at 25°C (gray squares and lines=TGEV; black circles and 
lines=MHV; dashed line=TGEV detection limit) (b) Infectivity at 4°C (gray diamonds and 
lines=TGEV; black triangles and lines=MHV) 
 
Figure  5-2 shows the infectious TGEV and MHV titers in lake water (pH 7.5, turbidity 
1.73 NTU) over 14 days at 4°C and 25°C. Time required for 99% reduction in infectious 
titer in lake water at 25°C was 13 days for TGEV and 10 days for MHV. At 4oC, TGEV 
infectivity declined by approximately 1 log10 by day 14; in contrast, MHV infectivity 
persisted with no decline in titer after 14 days at 4oC. Because there were only 2 time 
points (7 and 14 days), regression analysis was not performed on data from lake water. 
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Figure  5-2. Infectivity of TGEV and MHV as log10 (Nt/N0) over 14 days in lake water, 4 trials per 
point. Observed data=individual points; predicted values from regression analysis=continuous lines. 
(a) Infectivity at 25°C (gray squares and lines=TGEV; black circles and lines=MHV; dashed 
lines=detection limits) (b) Infectivity at 4°C (gray diamonds and lines=TGEV; black triangles and 
lines=MHV) 
 
The change in infectious titer of TGEV and MHV in pasteurized settled sewage (pH 
7.6, turbidity 17.6 NTU) over 35 days at 4°C and 25°C is summarized in Figure  5-3. 
Observed viral infectivity reduction values are plotted as individual data points. Predicted 
viral infectivity reductions obtained from regression analysis are plotted as solid lines 
(MHV, black lines, TGEV, gray lines). Both viruses exhibited a similar slow rate of 
decline in infectivity in settled sewage at 4°C, and a few percent of the initial viruses 
were still detectable after 35 days. Regression analysis showed that TGEV declined by 
approximately 0.3 log10 per week, and MHV by 0.2 log10 per week. Comparison of 
regression lines at 4°C for TGEV and MHV showed that inactivation rates for the two 
viruses differed significantly (p=0.01). 
There was a progressive decline in the infectivity of both TGEV and MHV over 35 
days at 25°C.  The reduction in infectivity of both viruses at 25°C follows typical first-
order kinetics (Fig 3a). There was a more rapid decline in infectivity titer of both viruses 
at 25°C than at 4oC (the experiment at 25°C was terminated at day 21 due to subsequent 
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growth of contaminating microorganisms in the test water). Regression analysis showed 
that infectivity of TGEV at 25°C declined by approximately 1.5 log10 per week, and that 
of MHV declined by approximately 2 log10 per week. Times for 99% reduction in 
infectious titer were 9 days for TGEV and 7 days or MHV. Comparison of regression 
lines at 25°C for TGEV and MHV showed that inactivation rates differed significantly 
between the two viruses (p=<0.001). 
 
 
Figure  5-3. Infectivity of TGEV and MHV as log10 (Nt/N0) over 35 days in pasteurized settled sewage, 
4 trials per point. Observed data=individual points; predicted values from regression 
analysis=continuous lines. (a) Infectivity at 25°C (gray squares and lines=TGEV; black circles and 
lines=MHV; dashed line=MHV detection limit) (b) Infectivity at 4°C (gray diamonds and 
lines=TGEV; black triangles and lines=MHV) 
 
Regression analysis on data from reagent-grade water and pasteurized settled sewage 
was compared to determine if water quality has an effect on virus survival. The results 
summarized in Table  5-2 show the predicted values obtained by regression analysis to 
achieve 90%, 99%, 99.9%, and 99.99% reduction of TGEV and MHV in each water type.  
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Table  5-2. Predicted times for decimal reductions of TGEV and MHV infectivity in different water 
types at 4°C and 25°C 
 Reagent grade water Pasteurized settled sewage 
Reduction 25°C 4°C 25°C 4°C 
log10 (Nt/N0) (%) TGEV MHV TGEV MHV TGEV MHV TGEV MHV 
-1 (90%) 11 9 110 >365 4 3 24 35 
-2 (99%) 22 17 220 >365 9 7 49 70 
-3 (99.9%) 33 26 330 >365 14 10 73 105 
-4 (99.99%) 44 35 330 >365 19 14 98 139 
 
The time required for 4 log10 (99.99%) infectivity reduction of TGEV at 25°C is 
longer in reagent-grade water than in pasteurized settled sewage (44 days vs. 19 days). 
This is also true of MHV infectivity (35 days in reagent-grade water vs. 14 days in 
sewage). There is also a difference in predicted inactivation times between viruses. In 
both water types, the predicted time to achieve a 4 log10 reduction in viral infectivity titer 
at 25°C is longer for TGEV than for MHV (44 days vs. 35 days in reagent-grade water 
and 19 days vs. 14 days in pasteurized settled sewage). At 4°C, the time required to 
achieve a 4 log10 reduction in infectivity titer in pasteurized settled sewage was 98 days 
for TGEV vs. 139 days for MHV, and predicted times for 4 log10 infectivity reduction of 
both viruses in reagent-grade water were approximately 1 year. Because  viral titer 
declined so slowly at 4°C, regression analysis based on this data set (where the longest 
elapsed time was 49 days) may not be a reliable way to predict viral reduction over long 
periods at 4°C in these water types. 
TGEV and MHV can survive and remain infectious for long periods in different water 
types ranging from highly treated water, to surface water to settled sewage at both low 
(4oC) and at typical temperate (25°C) ambient temperatures. In all water types, the titer of 
infectious virus declined more rapidly at 25°C than at 4°C.  The extent of virus reduction 
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also differed with water quality, with more rapid inactivation in reagent-grade water than 
settled sewage. In both reagent grade water and pasteurized settled sewage, inactivation 
rates were significantly different between the two viruses at 25°C. A linear regression 
model incorporating incubation time as a continuous variable and virus type (TGEV or 
MHV), water type (reagent grade water or pasteurized settled sewage) and temperature 
(4°C or 25°C) as dichotomous variables found that water type (p=0.0071), incubation 
time (p<0.0001) and temperature (p<0.0001) were significant predictors of log10 viral 
reduction. Virus type was not a significant predictor (p=0.28). Inclusion of an interaction 
variable for water type and temperature did not show significant interaction between 
these parameters (p=0.47). 
Discussion  
The extent of SARS-CoV survival in water, sewage and other aqueous media has been 
previously studied. Rabenau et al. (2005) found that the titer of SARS-CoV declines 
approximately 0.5 log10 over 9 days in a serum-free suspension of cell-culture medium at 
room temperature. This is a slower rate of inactivation than was observed for TGEV and 
MHV in reagent-grade water and pasteurized settled sewage, and may be due to a 
protective effect of the buffers, salts and organic nutrients found in cell culture medium. 
Longer survival in water with protective salts is supported by data from other 
investigators who found that SARS-CoV survived longer in PBS (14 days) than in 
dechlorinated tap water or domestic sewage (2 days) at 20°C (Wang et al., 2005). This is 
a much shorter survival time than was demonstrated for TGEV and MHV in this present 
study, but the authors did not report the actual change in titer or detection limit of the 
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assays performed. Therefore, a quantitative comparison of inactivation rates of the 
different coronaviruses in these aqueous media is not possible. 
At 4°C, the titer of infectious TGEV and MHV in all test water types remained stable 
over the course of the experiments. This is consistent with other investigations that found 
SARS-CoV persisting at least 14 days in domestic sewage and dechlorinated tap water at 
4°C. Again, direct quantitative comparisons of inactivation rates are difficult as these 
investigators did not report the actual changes in viral titers over time (Wang et al., 2005). 
In the present study coronavirus infectivity in water and sewage was followed for longer 
time periods than in previous studies using SARS Co-V. The coronaviruses studied were 
capable of remaining infectious in clean, highly treated waters, natural environmental 
waters, and waters contaminated with human fecal waste for periods of weeks. Infectivity 
titer reductions after time periods of about 6 weeks ranged from none, to slight (<1 log10) 
to modest (1-2 log10) at 4°C, depending on water quality and virus type.  
Temperature and incubation time were significant predictors of viral reduction, which 
is consistent with previous studies of viral survival in water (Yates, Gerba, and Kelley, 
1985; Enriquez, Hurst, and Gerba, 1995). Water type was a significant predictor of the 
rate of viral reduction, with greater reduction seen in pasteurized settled sewage as 
compared to reagent grade water. There are several factors that could contribute to 
greater reduction in more contaminated water, including pH, chemical constituents, and 
the presence of other microorganisms. MHV is stable over a pH range of 5-7.4 at 37°C 
and 3-10 at 4°C (Daniel and Talbot, 1987), and TGEV is stable over a pH range of 5-7 at 
37°C and 5-8 at 4°C (Pocock and Garwes, 1975). In pasteurized settled sewage spiked 
with MHV, pH declined over a period of weeks (data not shown). However, the pH 
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remained within the range of stability for these viruses, suggesting that it may not have be 
a significant factor in declining viral infectivity.  This finding of a lack of pH effect on 
virus survival is consistent with those of previous studies (Yates, Gerba, and Kelley, 
1985). Other investigations have found that virus survival in water is influenced by high 
molecular weight dissolved matter (Noble, and Fuhrman, 1997), which is present in 
higher concentrations in sewage. Chemical constituents found in sewage may also have 
antiviral activity (Sobsey et al., 1980); antiviral effects may be due to the activity of 
bacteria feeding on the viral macromolecules and producing metabolites having antiviral 
activity, such as proteolytic enzymes that attack virion proteins (Deng and Cliver, 1992; 
Deng and Cliver, 1995). Such antiviral activities of microbes in wastewater may be 
responsible for the lower rates of coronavirus survival observed in sewage than in reagent 
water in this study. 
It has been well-established with other human pathogens that formation of droplets 
and aerosols from water contaminated with microorganisms can serve as a vehicle for 
transmission of both respiratory and enteric infections, including Legionella (Butler and 
Breiman, 1998), Cryptosporidium (CDC, 1998). and aerosolization of body fluids and 
fecal matter can serve as a source of both enteric and respiratory infections, such as 
noroviruses (Marks, 2003) and hantaviruses (LeDuc, 1998). SARS has demonstrated a 
unique human-to-human fecal-droplet-respiratory transmission route, observed in the 
Amoy Gardens apartment building SARS outbreak. When an individual shedding 
infectious virus in their feces used the toilet facilities in a building, a combination of 
faulty drain traps and the use of powerful exhaust fans in residential units resulted in 
virus-laden liquid droplets being drawn into living spaces via floor drains. The droplets 
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were inhaled by other occupants and carried on air currents to other areas of the building, 
causing an outbreak (McKinney et al., 2006; WHO, 2003). Although more data is needed 
on the survival of SARS-CoV in fecal droplets and aerosols to assess this risk pathway, 
the airborne fecal droplet transmission model, and the length of time that coronaviruses 
have been shown to remain infectious in water and sewage, suggest that aqueous media 
fecally contaminated by SARS-CoV could pose a health risk in future outbreaks. 
The results of this study suggest that coronaviruses can survive for sufficiently long 
periods of time in water and sewage for these vehicles to serve as a source of exposure. 
The persistent survival of coronaviruses at low temperatures in highly treated potable 
waters has important exposure risk implications for its spread via fecally contaminated 
water should it re-emerge. If SARS-CoV-contaminated water or sewage becomes 
aerosolized, it could potentially cause virus exposure to large groups of people. This 
could be an ongoing risk during an outbreak, even in the presence of quarantine measures 
to isolate infected individuals from others until they are recovered. Building water or 
sewer systems contaminated with persistent infectious SARS coronavirus might also 
defeat quarantine measures by continuing to spread virus even after an infected individual 
has been removed from the area. The persistence of coronaviruses in water and sewage 
found in this study suggests that quarantine measures, which proved effective in 
containing the last SARS outbreak, could be seriously undermined unless adequate 
attention is paid to the safety and security of building plumbing systems. Should SARS or 
other fecally transmissible respiratory viruses emerge in the future, outbreak control 
measures should include adequate inspection, repair, and disinfection of water and 
sewerage systems in structures where outbreaks have taken place. Such measures can 
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ensure that if these systems become contaminated by fecal waste from infected 
individuals, they do not become water-related vehicles for the continued spread of 
disease, even after infected hosts are no longer present. Further experiments are necessary 
to better determine the kinetics of SARS-CoV survival or inactivation in water, sewage 
and other aqueous media. Presently, TGEV and MHV may serve as conservative 
indicators of the survival of SARS-CoV in water and sewage.  
Conclusions 
• TGEV and MHV can survive and remain infectious for long periods in different 
water types including highly treated water, surface water, and sewage  
• TGEV and MHV can survive and remain infectious at both low (4oC) and at typical 
temperate ambient (25°C) temperatures.  
• In all water types, the titer of infectious virus declined more rapidly at 25°C than at 
4°C.   
• Water type, incubation time, and temperature were significant predictors of log10 viral 
reduction kinetics.  
• TGEV and MHV may serve as conservative indicators of the survival of SARS-CoV 
in water and sewage.  
• The persistent survival of coronaviruses at low temperatures in highly treated potable 
waters has important exposure risk implications for its spread via fecally 
contaminated water should it re-emerge in human populations. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
Survival of surrogate coronaviruses on environmental surfaces 
Introduction 
The possible role of environmental surfaces in the spread of nosocomial viral infection 
has been recognized for some time (Sepkowitz, 1996; Sattar, 2004), with healthcare 
surface disinfection being proposed for the control of viruses such as influenza, rotavirus, 
calicivirus, and coronaviruses (Sattar, 2004). The question of whether hospital surfaces 
play a role in the spread of nosocomial viral infection took on particular urgency during 
the worldwide outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a novel 
coronavirus infection which was driven partly by nosocomial spread. Cases of SARS 
were documented among healthcare workers, patients, and visitors in healthcare facilities 
(McDonald et al., 2004). During outbreaks of SARS in healthcare facilities, studies were 
done to determine whether SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was present on surfaces in 
outbreak settings. Sampling of surfaces in hospitals in Taiwan and Thailand, including 
surfaces in patient rooms and areas on floors used for isolation of SARS patients, found 
SARS-CoV nucleic acids on surfaces and inanimate objects in patient rooms, nurses’ 
stations, and public areas of the hospital (Dowell et al., 2004, Booth et al., 2005). 
Infectious virus was not cultured from any of the samples, so it is unclear whether this 
evidence of viral nucleic acid was indicative of infectious SARS-CoV presence on 
hospital surfaces in outbreak settings. The presence of nucleic acids, however, suggests 
the possibility that infectious virus was present on these surfaces for a period of time, and 
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these surfaces could become sources of further viral transmission. Assessing the risk 
posed by SARS-CoV on surfaces is difficult without knowing how long these viruses 
survive on environmental surfaces, and how that survival is affected by the type of 
surface and factors in the surrounding environment, such as temperature and humidity 
level. Gathering such data using SARS-CoV is difficult due to the challenges of working 
with this virus in biosafety level 3 containment.  
The development of surrogates for studying the environmental survival of SARS-CoV 
would advance our understanding of the survival and resistance of this virus on 
environmental surfaces, the possible role of such surfaces in the transmission of SARS, 
and the risk posed by contaminated surfaces in outbreak settings. The objective of this 
work was to determine the effect of temperature and humidity on the survival of 
surrogate coronaviruses for SARS-CoV on surfaces.  
The selection of coronaviruses as surrogates for SARS-CoV is complicated by the fact 
that genetic analysis suggests SARS-CoV is not a member of either of the two currently 
recognized groups of mammalian coronaviruses (Marra et al., 2003; Ruan et al., 2003). 
Therefore, to elucidate possible differences in survival among members of the 
Coronaviridae that are possible surrogates for SARS, viruses from both groups of 
mammalian coronaviruses were selected. Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), an 
enteric swine pathogen, and 229E, a human respiratory pathogen, were selected form 
Group 1.  Mouse hepatitis virus (MHV), a murine neurologic pathogen, and OC43, a 
human respiratory pathogen, were selected from Group 2. These candidate viruses were 
used to evaluate the survival of coronaviruses on different surface types, and the effect of 
temperature and humidity on coronavirus survival on these surfaces. 
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Materials and Methods 
Preparation of viral stocks 
TGEV and MHV were kindly provided by R. Baric, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, NC; 229E and OC43 were kindly provided by D. Erdman, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.  Cell lines were obtained from the 
American Type Culture Collection (Manassass, VA) and the Lineberger Comperhensive 
Cancer Center (University of North Carolina Chapel Hill). Cell lines used were: swine 
testicular cells for TGEV (ST, ATCC# CRL-1746); delayed brain tumor cells (DBT) for 
MHV; human lung fibroblast cells for 229E (MRC-5, ATCC# CCL-171); human 
ileocecal colorectal adenocarcinoma cells for OC43 (HCT-8, ATCC# CCL-244). Viral 
stocks were propagated by infecting confluent layers of host cell cultures in flasks, 
harvesting cell lysates, clarifying by centrifugation (3000×g, 30 min, 4°C), and storing 
resulting supernatants as virus stock at -80°C. Viral titers were determined by quantal 
assays on confluent host cell layers in 24-well plates and computed by the most probable 
number (MPN) method. 
Infectivity assays 
TGEV and MHV were propagated and assayed in maintenance medium consisting of 
Eagle’s  minimum essential medium (MEM), 7.5% sodium bicarbonate, HEPES buffer, 
10% bovine serum replacement (Fetal Clone II, Hyclone, Logan, UT), 10% lactalbumin 
hydrolysate, non-essential amino acids, 1 mM sodium pyruvate and gentamicin (0.1 
mg/mL)/kanamycin (0.05 mg/mL). 229E and OC43 were propagated and assayed in 
maintenance medium consisting of Eagle’s  minimum essential medium (MEM), 10% 
newborn calf serum (Fetal Clone II, Hyclone, Logan, UT),  7.5% sodium bicarbonate, 
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HEPES buffer, glutamine, non-essential amino acids, 1 mM sodium pyruvate, gentamicin 
(0.1 mg/mL)/kanamycin (0.05 mg/mL) and nystatin (100 U/mL). 
For TGEV, MHV, and 229E assays, inoculated cell cultures were examined 
microscopically after incubation for visible cytopathic effect. Coronavirus OC43 does not 
produce visible cytopathic effect when grown in HCT-8 cells. To measure the infectivity 
of this virus, primers were designed targeting the O (open reading frame 1) genes for use 
in combined cell culture infectivity/reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) assays. Confluent layers of HCT-8 cells were infected in 24-well plates and 
incubated for 5 days. Inoculated cell layers were washed 2x with PBS to remove residual 
virus from the cell layer. Viral RNA was then extracted from cells using the RNEasy 
Mini Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA). Viral RNA was detected using RT-PCR with the 
Qiagen OneStep RT-PCR kit in a Gradient Cycler. Nucleic acid was amplified in a 25µL 
reaction containing 5µL of RNA template, 5µL 5x Qiagen 1-step RT-PCR buffer, 0.2µM 
dNTP, 0.6µM each primer, 10U RNasin RNase inhibitor (Promega, Madison, WI), and 
1µL Qiagen OneStep RT-PCR Enzyme Mix.  
Primers orfw (5´-CGGGATCCATGAGAACGGTGATAAATTAGATCAGT-3´) and 
orfrt (5´-GCACACGACTACCTTCTACATCAAATG-3´) were used to amplify a 156 bp 
fragment of the ORF1 gene. Conditions were: Reverse transcription at 50°C, 30 min; 
activation at 95°C 15 min; 40 cycles of denaturation at 94°C 30s, annealing at 50°C 1 
min, and extension at 72°C 1.5 min; and a final extension step of 72°C for 10 min. DNA 
was visualized on 2% agarose gels with ethidium bromide staining. Heat-inactivated 
OC43 (65°C, 60 min) was used as a control to check for false-positive PCR signals from 
inactivated virus.  
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Survival experiments 
Viral stocks were prepared as described above. Viral inocula were suspended in cell 
culture media to simulate the protein-containing matrices in which viruses may be 
deposited onto healthcare surfaces. Controlled humidity environments were created by 
the use of calcium sulfate granules (Drierite CO., Xenia, OH) or saturated salt solutions 
in sealed containers, and temperature and humidity were monitored using digital meters. 
For temperature and humidity experiments, test surfaces were 1 cm2 stainless steel 
carriers with a No. 4 polish. Carriers were prepared by washing in 0.01% Tween 80, 
rinsing in 70% ethanol, followed by rinsing in distilled water, and then autoclaving. 
Sample volumes of 10µL were inoculated onto three replicate carriers for each time point 
and inoculated carriers placed in the controlled humidity environment. Control carriers 
(time 0 samples) were sampled immediately after drying at the desired temperature and 
humidity level. At each time point, carriers were removed, placed in a well plate, and 
covered with 1 mL 1.5% beef extract 7.5. Viruses were eluted by gentle agitation on a 
shaking platform for 20 minutes. The carrier was removed and the eluent was assayed for 
virus infectivity on the appropriate cell line.  
Other test surfaces used were ceramic tile, laminate (Formica), plastic (polypropylene), 
contact isolation gowns (MediChoice, Arden, NC), latex gloves (Evolution One, 
Microflex, Reno, NV), respirators (N95 1860 healthcare particulate respirator, 3M Co., St. 
Paul, MN), and nitrile gloves. Carriers were 1 cm2 pieces of the test surfaces. Sample 
volumes of 10µL were inoculated onto three replicate carriers for each time point and 
placed in a controlled humidity environment at 20°C and 50% (±3%) to simulate the 
ambient conditions in healthcare environments. At each time point, carriers were 
removed and eluted as described above. Data analysis was carried out using Excel 2003 
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(Microsoft Corp.), and GraphPad Prism 5 (GraphPad, San Diego, CA). The parameter 
log10 (Nt/N0), (where Nt is the virus concentration in MPN at time t, and N0 is the initial 
virus concentration in MPN on the positive control sample at time 0) versus time was 
used to perform regression analysis on virus inactivation rates for each test condition of 
virus type, temperature, and relative humidity. 
Results 
Eluent comparison 
Four candidate eluents were tested for their efficiency in eluting TGEV and MHV 
from the stainless steel carriers used in experiments: PBS, TSB, 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5, 
and cell culture medium (CCM). Virus was placed on carriers in 10µL volumes and 
allowed to dry in a biological safety cabinet, eluted, and the eluate assayed for viral 
infectivity. Results are shown in Figure  6-1. The quantity of initial virus recovered did 
not differ significantly by eluent (p=0.31) (the amount of virus applied to carriers was 
4.39 log10 PFU for MHV and 3.25 log10 PFU for TGEV). The mean recovery of both 
viruses was slightly higher using 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5. This was selected as the 
eluent for subsequent experiments.  
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Figure  6-1. Comparison of eluents for the recovery of TGEV and MHV dried onto stainless steel 
carriers. Gray bars, MHV (solid gray line: virus titer deposited on carrier, 4.39 log10); dotted bars, 
TGEV (dashed line: virus titer deposited on carrier, 3.25 log10). 
 
Temperature and humidity 
The survival of TGEV, MHV, and 229E was determined at three temperatures: 4°C, 
20°C and 40°C. For each temperature, three relative humidity (RH) levels were 
evaluated: 20%, 50%, and 80% RH. The effect of humidity on viral survival at 4°C is 
shown in Figure  6-2.  
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Figure  6-2. Survival of TGEV, MHV, and 229E at 4°C a) 20% RH b) 50% RH c) 80% RH. (Black 
squares: TGEV; black circles: MHV; gray triangles: 229E; symbols with white centers: sample was 
below detection limit of the assay; solid line: regression line for TGEV; dashed line: regression line 
for MHV) 
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Viral titer was stable for up to 28 days at 4°C and low relative humidity, with loss of 
less than 1 log10 of initial infectious virus titer over 14 days for 229E at 20% and 80% RH 
(experiment was terminated at 14 days) and over 28 days for TGEV and MHV. At 50% 
RH, 229E did not survive drying onto the carrier. The decline in TGEV and MHV 
infectivity titer follows first-order (log-linear) kinetics. The slopes of regression lines for 
TGEV and MHV at 4°C and each RH level are shown in Table  6-1. 
Table  6-1. Slopes of regression lines for virus inactivation rates at 4°C and RH levels of 20, 50 and 
80% 
 Slope of regression line (95% CI) 
% RH TGEV MHV 229E 
20 -0.021 (-0.033 to -0.01) -0.021 (-0.034 to -0.0082) -0.019 (-0.036 to -0.0012) 
50 -0.11 (-0.14 to -0.07) -0.15 (-0.18 to -0.12) Too few points to estimate 
80 -0.13 (-0.16 to -0.11) -0.11 (-0.13 to -0.09) -0.11 (-0.14 to -0.083) 
 
Comparing the slopes of the regression lines, the rate of change in infectious titer 
(inactivation rate) of TGEV at 20% RH is significantly different from that at 50% and 
80% RH. However,  inactivation rates of TGEV at 50% and 80% RH do not differ 
significantly from each other. The inactivation rates of MHV are significantly different at 
all three humidity levels. The inactivation rates for 229E at 20% and 80% RH also differ 
significantly from each other. At each humidity level, the virus inactivation rates (slopes 
of regression lines) do not differ significantly among the three viruses. Inactivation at 
50% and 80% RH was more rapid than at 20% RH over the period of the experiment.  
Rates of virus inactivation are sufficiently low that infectious viruses deposited on 
surfaces in high numbers (3 to 4 log10 viruses) could persist for 28 days at all three RH 
levels (low, medium and high) and low temperature. 
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The effect of humidity on viral survival at 20°C is shown in Figure  6-3. Inactivation 
was more rapid at 20°C at all humidity levels compared to 4°C However, TGEV and 
MHV could survive for weeks at 20% RH, with a 2 log10 decline in infectious titer over 
28 days. At 50% RH, both TGEV and MHV infectious titer declined by 2.3 log10 in 3 
days. At 80% RH, TGEV infectivity titer declined by 3.1 log10 in 14 days; at 50% RH, a 
5 log10 decrease in TGEV infectivity titer, as predicted by regression analysis, would take 
place in 5 days. MHV infectivity declined by 5 log10 in 10 days at 80% RH, compared to 
a predicted decline of 5 log10 in 7 days at 50% RH. 229E was inactivated more rapidly, 
with infectivity declining by 1.2 log10 within 24 hours at 20% RH and by 0.6 log10 within 
24 hours at 80% RH. 229E did not survive drying onto the carrier at 50% RH.  
 98 
0 7 14 21 28
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Day
Lo
g 1
0 
(N
t/N
0)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Day
Lo
g 1
0 
(N
t/N
0)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Day
Lo
g 1
0 
(N
t/N
0)
a
b
c
 
Figure  6-3. Survival of TGEV, MHV, and 229E at 20°C a) 20% RH b) 50% RH c) 80% RH.  (Black 
squares: TGEV; black circles: MHV; gray triangles: 229E; symbols with white centers: sample was 
below detection limit of the assay; solid line: regression line for TGEV; dashed line: regression line 
for MHV) 
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Because of the difficulty of propagating 229E to high titers, it was not possible to 
observe extensive log reductions of 229E infectivity at the conditions tested However, the 
infectivity reductions over 24 hours suggest that this virus is inactivated more rapidly 
than either TGEV or MHV at 20°C. The decline in viral titer at 20°C for TGEV and 
MHV follows log-linear, first-order kinetics. The slopes of regression lines for TGEV, 
MHV, and 29E inactivation at 20°C and each RH level are shown in Table  6-2 
Table  6-2. Slopes of regression lines for inactivation rates of test coronaviruses at 20°C and 20, 50 
and 80% RH 
 Slope of regression line (95% CI) 
% RH TGEV MHV 229E 
20 -0.081 (-0.09 to -0.067) -0.061 (-0.074 to -0.048) -1.5 (-2.3 to -0.62) 
50 -0.90 (-1.08 to -0.72) -0.69 (-0.77 to -0.60) Too few points 
80 -0.21 (-0.23 to -0.20) -0.49 (-0.52 to -0.47) -0.63 (-0.79 to -0.47) 
 
Comparisons of the slopes of the regression lines for TGEV inactivation rates at 20°C 
show significant differences among them, with the order of inactivation rates being 50% 
> 80% > 20%. Inactivates rates of MHV also differed significantly with RH, with the 
order of inactivation rates again being 50% > 80% > 20%. However, slopes of regression 
lines at 20% and 80% RH did not differ significantly for 229E, even though rates (slopes) 
differed by >2-fold, perhaps due to the variability of results. The inactivation rates 
(slopes) for TGEV and MHV do not differ significantly at 20% and 50% RH, but they are 
significantly different from the inactivation rate (slope) at 80% RH. 229E appeared to 
survive better at 80% than 20% RH, but this is based on few data points compared to 
those for TGEV and MHV. 
Figure  6-4 shows virus inactivation rates at 40°C and the same RH levels of 20, 50 
and 80%. Overall, viruses were inactivated more rapidly at 40°C than at 20°C. At both 
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50% and 80% RH, viruses did not survive long enough to dry onto the carrier. 
Consequently, they were sampled at 2, 4, and 6 hour time points after inoculation, while 
virus was still wet. At 20% RH, MHV infectivity declined by 4.7 log10 in 5 days, and 
TGEV infectivity declined by 3.5 log10 in 5 days. Virus infectivity reduction at 50% was 
more rapid than 80%, with infectivity titer reduction of 4.2 log10 in 18 hours for MHV, 
and 4.6 log10 in 12 hours for TGEV. Unlike the results at 20°C,  the loss of infectivity at 
40°Cwas more rapid at 80% RH compared to 50%. At 40°C and 80% RH, MHV, TGEV, 
and 229E lost 4.1, 2.8, and 1.9 log10 infectious titer at 3 hours, respectively.  
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Figure  6-4. Survival of TGEV, MHV, and 229E at 40°C a) 20% RH b) 50% RH c) 80% RH. (Black 
squares: TGEV; black circles: MHV; gray triangles: 229E; symbols with white centers: sample was 
below detection limit of the assay; solid line: regression line for TGEV; dashed line: regression line 
for MHV) 
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The decline in viral titer at 40°C for TGEV and MHV follows log-linear, first-order 
kinetics, with one exception. At 40°C and 50% RH, MHV inactivation kinetics appear to 
display a possible tailing effect, with initial rapid inactivation at 2 and 4 hours a decline 
in inactivation rate at 12 hours and little further titer decline and stable virus infectivity 
titers from 12-24 hours. This declining inactivation rate over time or “tailing effect” is 
not seen with the other viruses tested, and the reasons for it are unclear. The slopes of the 
fitted regression lines for virus inactivation rates at 40°C and each RH level are shown in 
Table  6-3. 
Table  6-3. Slopes of regression lines for virus inactivation rates at 20°C and RH levels of 20, 50 and 
80% 
 Slope of regression line (95% CI) 
% RH TGEV MHV 229E 
20 -0.036 (-0.044 to -0.029 -0.041 (-0.044 to -0.038) -0.26 (-0.37 to -0.16) 
50 -0.40 (-0.44 to -0.37) -0.25 (-0.31 to -0.19) too few points 
80 -0.41 (-0.47 to -0.36) -0.59 (-0.70 to -0.47) -0.32 (-0.36 to -0.29) 
 
The slopes of regression lines for TGEV do not differ significantly between 50% and 
80% RH, However, the slope for TGEV inactivation rate at 20% RH is significantly 
different and much smaller than at 20 and 50% RH. The slopes for MHV inactivation 
rates at 20°C differ significantly at all three RH levels. For 229E, there is no significant 
difference between the slopes of inactivation rates at 20% and 80% RH. At 20% RH, 
rates of inactivation are low and  similar for TGEV and MHV, as was seen at 20°C. In 
contrast, rates of 229E inactivation are more rapid than for the other two viruses. At 50% 
RH, the inactivation rate is significantly greater for TGEV (-0.40) than for MHV (-0.31), 
with a rate difference of 0.15 log10 per day.  However at 80% RH, the inactivation rates 
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of TGEV (-0.41) and MHV (-0.59) differ by 0.18 log10/day, but they are  not significantly 
different.  
Regression analysis was performed on survival data on SS for each virus, temperature, 
and RH level. Table  6-4shows predicted values obtained by regression analysis for times 
to achieve 90%, 99%, and 99.9% reduction of TGEV, MHV, and 229E at each 
temperature and RH. At 4°C and 20%, viral titer declines so slowly that regression 
analysis based on this data set (where the longest elapsed time was 28 days) may not be 
reliable to predict viral reduction over long periods. At ambient temperature (20°C), 
viruses may be able to survive with no more than 1 log10 or 90% decline in infectivity for 
1 or more days on SS surfaces, with the extent of decline depending on the humidity level.  
For TGEV and MHV, survival at 20°C was longest at 20% RH. Virus survival is lower at 
higher temperature.  At 40°C, time for 1 log10 or 90% reductions occurred in 1-12 hours 
at 50% and 80% RH, depending on the virus type. At 20% RH and 40°C, virus survival 
was longer, with 1 log10 or 90% inactivation estimated to occur 3 hours and 1 day, 
depending on virus type.   
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Table  6-4. Predicted times (in days) by regression analysis for 90, 99, and 99.9% reduction of 
infectious virus on a stainless steel surface at varying temperature and RH. 
TGEV 
 4°C 20°C 40°C 
reduction 20% 50% 80% 20% 50% 80% 20% 50% 80% 
-1 (90%) 50 9 8 12 1 4 1 2 hrs 2 hrs 
-2 (99%) -- 18 15 24 2 9 2 4 hrs 4 hrs 
-3 (99.9%) -- 28 22 37 3 14 4 7 hrs 7 hrs 
MHV 
 4°C 20°C 40°C 
reduction 20% 50% 80% 20% 50% 80% 20% 50% 80% 
-1 (90%) 48 7 9 16 1 2 1 3 hrs 1 hr 
-2 (99%) -- 13 18 33 3 4 2 8 hrs 3 hrs 
-3 (99.9%) -- 20 28 49 4 6 3 12 hrs 5 hrs 
229E 
 4°C 20°C 40°C 
reduction 20% 50% 80% 20% 50% 80% 20% 50% 80% 
-1 (90%) 50 ND 9 1 ND 1 3 hrs 1 hr 3 hrs 
-2 (99%) -- ND 18 1.5 ND 3 7 hrs 2 hrs 6 hrs 
-3 (99.9%) -- ND 27 2 ND 4 11 hrs 3 hrs 9 hrs 
 
The survival of TGEV and MHV on environmental surfaces was further evaluated 
using several materials than may serve as fomites in healthcare environments. Virus 
survival was assessed on polypropylene plastic, laminate, ceramic, latex gloves, nitrile 
gloves, N95 masks, and contact isolation gowns (made of polypropylene and 
polyethylene) at constant temperature and RH. These experiments were done at 20°C and 
50% RH to simulate ambient temperature and RH conditions in healthcare environments. 
Experiments were carried out for short periods (2-24 hours) to simulate conditions in 
healthcare environments, where surfaces are subject to regular cleaning and items such as 
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gloves and other PPE are worn for short periods during patient care and then discarded. 
Results are shown in Figure  6-5.  
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Figure  6-5. a) survival of MHV on nonporous materials b) survival of TGEV on nonporous materials 
c) survival of MHV on PPE materials d) survival of TGEV on PPE materials (black 
triangles=ceramic; black circles=plastic; gray squares=laminate; gray diamonds=N95 mask; upside 
down triangles=latex gloves; black diamonds=gown; gray circles=nitrile glove) 
 
MHV survived for short periods on nonporous plastic, ceramic, and laminate surfaces, 
with infectivity titer losses of 1.5-2.7 log10 in the first two hours. MHV survived for up to 
24 hours on laminate, with approximately 2 log10 infectious titer loss. MHV survival in 
ceramic and plastic was less than on laminate, with infectivity titer losses of 3.6 log10 and 
4.8 log10 for respectively at 12 hours (Figure 1a). On PPE, virus survival varied by 
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material type. MHV infectivity was stable on N95 respirator material for up to 4 hours. 
On contact isolation gowns and latex and nitrile gloves, MHV infectivity titer declined ~3 
log10 within 4 hours. MHV survival results on laminate were similar to those for TGEV, 
with 2 log10 loss of infectivity over 24 hours. TGEV survived less well than MHV on 
N95 respirator material, contact isolation gowns, N95 respirators, nitrile gloves, and latex 
gloves, with infectivity titer declines of 2-2.6 log10 within 4 hours. 
Discussion 
These results of these studies show that if deposited in high numbers (103-104 log10), 
coronaviruses dried onto surfaces may survive for days at temperatures and humidity 
levels found in health care environments. Overall, virus survival was enhanced by lower 
temperatures, with progressively slower inactivation rates at 4°C>20°C>40°C. Similar 
relationships have been observed for TGEV and MHV survival in water (Casanova et al., 
unpublished data), canine coronaviruses in liquid suspension (Tennant, Gaskell, and 
Gaskell, 1994), and coronaviruses in aerosols (Ijaz et al., 1985). In general virus survival 
is longer at lower (4-6°C) compared to ambient (20°C) temperatures. The results of this 
study are also consistent with those obtained for other viruses on surfaces.  Survival of 
non-enveloped viruses such as hepatitis A, poliovirus and adenovirus is also greater at 
low temperatures (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Abad et al., 2001; Mbithi, Springthorpe, 
and Sattar, 1991; Sattar et al., 1986). The effect of temperature on virus survival on 
surfaces appears to be similar to the effects on virus survival in other environmental 
media such as air, water and soil. 
In these experiments, the relationship between virus inactivation on surfaces and 
relative humidity level was not monotonic, which is consistent with survival observations 
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made by other investigators for some non-enveloped virus dried on surfaces. As was seen 
with TGEV and MHV, survival of some non-enveloped viruses is greater at high than at 
low relative humidity (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Sattar et al., 1988). This has been 
observed for human rotavirus on stainless steel, plastic, and glass, on which rates of viral 
inactivation were higher at 50% RH than at 25%, and higher at 80% RH than at 50% 
(Sattar et al., 1986). Human rhinovirus survival had an opposite relationship with RH, 
with survival on surfaces of 14 hours at high RH but only 2 hr at low RH (Sattar et al., 
1987). Studies of hepatitis A survival on surfaces between 25 and 95% RH, report 
survival is inversely proportional to the RH level 
At 20°C, inactivation of TGEV and MHV in these experiments was slower at 20% RH 
compared to 50% RH and 80% RH. Inactivation was sometimes also slower at 80% RH 
than 50%, but the difference was not always significant. Previous studies of TGEV in 
aerosols have found greater viral recovery from aerosols at low RH than at high RH (Kim 
et al., 2007), suggesting possible longer survival of coronaviruses at low RH. This is 
consistent with experiments examining the survival of human coronavirus 229E in 
aerosols, which found that aerosolize virus survived longer at low RH compared to high 
RH (20% inactivation after 25 hours at 20% RH vs. 90% inactivation after 25 hours at 
80% RH). The relationship between relative humidity and virus survival in aerosols was 
not monotonic; the trend from greatest to least inactivation was 80%>20%>50% (Ijaz et 
al., 1985). Results from this study suggest a roughly U-shaped relationship (or inverted 
triangular distribution) on surfaces, with greater survival or a protective effect at 
moderate (50%) RH and lower survival at both high (80%) and low RH (20%) RH. 
Conflicting results in previous literature suggest that this relationship may vary greatly by 
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virus type. Because much of the previous work done has been with non-enveloped 
viruses, the results may not be directly applicable to predicting the survival of enveloped 
viruses on surfaces. 
Other investigators have also found that when virus survival is compared at specific 
RH levels but different temperatures, the basic relationship between survival and RH 
level remained the same. However, the effect of RH level on virus survival was “less 
pronounced” at lower temperatures compared to higher temperatures (Mbithi, 
Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991). This effect was also observed with coronaviruses. 
Inactivation of TGEV, MHV and 229E was slower at 4°C than at 20°C, but at both 
temperatures, viral inactivation was slower at 20% RH than at 50% or 80%.  Virus 
inactivation was also slower at 80% RH than at 50%. At 40°C, the same protective effect 
of low RH was seen at 20% RH compared to 50% and 80%, but overall, inactivation was 
more rapid at all three RH levels at this temperature. It may be that at 40°C, temperature 
effects predominate in causing viral inactivation, with RH levels playing a lesser role 
than they do at lower temperatures. The coronavirus data presented here, as well as 
previous findings with non-enveloped viruses, suggest that although rates of viral 
inactivation are slower at lower temperatures, there are still differential effects of 
humidity on viral survival at varying temperatures. Because the relationship between 
temperature, humidity and virus inactivation is still not entirely clear, and may differ by 
virus type (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991), 
further comparative studies are recommended. 
In this study, human coronavirus 229E infectivity declined by 1.2 log10 after 24 hours 
at 20% RH and by 0.6 log10 after 24 hours at 80% RH. Previous studies of 229E survival 
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found that it lost ~3 log10 of infectivity over 6 hours on an aluminum surface at 20°C 
when RH was between 50 and 75% (Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 2000). In our studies, 229E 
did not survive drying onto stainless steel carriers at 20°C and 50% RH, a process that 
took 4-6 hours at this temperature and RH. The rapid inactivation of 229E observed by 
Sizun et al. may represent the effect of moderate (~50%) RH on virus survival. The 
results of this study also suggest that TGEV and MHV dried onto surfaces at ambient 
temperatures are much more resistant to inactivation than 229E. It is difficult to 
determine from existing data whether TGEV and MHV are more or less resistant to 
inactivation on surfaces than SARS CoV. SARS-CoV has been reported to survive for 36 
hours on stainless steel when 104 TCID50 are deposited initially (WHO, 2003), but the 
temperature and humidity conditions for this experiment were not reported, making 
comparisons difficult. However, a reduction of 4 log10 infectious titer in 36 hours was 
greater than that seen for either TGEV or MHV at 20°C at any RH level in this study. 
Rabenau et al. (2005) reported much slower inactivation of SARS-CoV on a polystyrene 
surface, with a reduction of 4 log10 after 9 days (RH conditions not reported). This 
observed persistence of SAR-CoV is consistent with observations of TGEV and MHV 
persistence at 20°C and 50% RH in this study. Based on their observed comparable 
persistence, TGEV and MHV may be suitable models for survival and inactivation of 
SARS-CoV on surfaces Coronavirus 229E appears to be inactivated much more quickly 
than SARS-CoV and therefore may be less effective as a surrogate for it in this context. 
However, more data are needed on the survival rates and inactivation kinetics of SARS-
CoV itself before these relationships with other coronaviruses can be definitively 
established.  
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These results of this study also show that TGEV and MHV deposited in high numbers 
(104-105 MPN) survive on materials used to make PPE, although inactivation is more 
rapid than on stainless steel surfaces. This finding differs from previous studies of 
survival of human coronavirus 229E on latex surfaces, in which survival on latex and 
stainless steel was similar (Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 2000). TGEV and MHV infectivity on 
latex at 20°C and 50% RH in this declined by ~3 log10 in 4 hours. This infectivity decline 
is similar to 229E, which was reported to decline by ~3 log10 in 6 hours at 20°C when RH 
was between 50 and 75% (Sizun, Yu, and Talbot, 2000). Because humidity was not 
controlled in the previous studies of 229E, it is difficult to determine what the 
contributions of RH conditions and surface type to virus stability or inactivation in those 
studies. The data for TGEV and MHV suggest that contact isolation gowns, N95 
respirators, and gloves contribute to the loss of virus infectivity on these materials. 
Consistent with results for non-enveloped viruses on stainless steel surfaces, coronavirus 
infectivity also appears to be less persistent on latex than are non-enveloped viruses. 
Non-enveloped viruses persist for weeks on latex with only 1-3 log10 decline in 
infectivity (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994). In the survival experiments conducted on PPE, 
ceramic, laminate, and plastic at 50 and 80% RH, the viral inoculum is drying in the first 
4-5 hours at these RH levels. The shape of the inactivation curve within the first several 
hours at these RH levels suggests that inactivation during drying may not follow first-
order kinetics. Instead of linear kinetics throughout the duration of the experiment, it may 
be that viral inactivation during drying follows non-first-order kinetics, and inactivation 
after drying is complete then follows first-order kinetics. However, further experiments 
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are needed to more precisely define the kinetics of viral inactivation during the drying 
process. 
The mechanisms of inactivation of viruses on surfaces have not been completely 
elucidated, but a number of contributing factors may have a role . Studies have shown 
that virus inactivation can take place at the air-water interface (AWI) of a solution 
(Thompson and Yates, 1999; Trouwborst et al., 1974). The surfaces of viral capsids can 
have both hydrophobic and hydrophilic regions, which may drive them to accumulate at 
the AWI as hydrophobic regions of the virions partition out of solution and hydrophilic 
regions remain in solution (Thompson et al., 1998). It is possible that forces exerted on 
viral particles as they partition at the AWI lead to structural damage and viral inactivation 
(Trouwborst et al., 1974). This phenomenon may play a role in inactivation of viruses in 
liquid suspensions that are placed on surfaces, because droplets of liquid will have an 
AWI on the surface of the droplet until desiccation has taken place. Interactions between 
the virus and the AWI may also help to explain why enveloped viruses on surfaces do not 
survive as long as non-enveloped viruses. Viruses with hydrophobic surface properties 
have a higher affinity for the AWI (Thompson and Yates, 1999), resulting in inactivation 
by protein unfolding and damage (Trouwborst et al., 1974). The lipid envelopes on the 
surfaces of coronaviruses may have this affinity for the AWI, resulting in greater 
inactivation at the interface compared to non-enveloped viruses. Coronaviruses also have 
a spike protein which protrudes from the viral surface. This protein has both hydrophobic 
and polar regions (Bosch et al., 2003; Spiga et al., 2003), which may cause viral particles 
to partition along the AWI, leading to viral inactivation.  
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On surfaces, the AWI may not be the only site where viral inactivation is taking place. 
Studies of bacteriophage survival at the AWI in contact with surfaces have identified a 
role for the location where the liquid, solid, and gas phases meet, called the triple-phase-
boundary (TPB). Forces operate at the boundary where liquid, air, and a hydrophobic 
surface meet, such as reorientation of water molecules as they encounter the hydrophobic 
surface. Viruses that partition at the TPB can be structurally damaged by these forces, 
leading to inactivation (Thompson et al., 1998). This may explain virus inactivation on 
surfaces such as contact isolation gowns, which can be made of hydrophobic materials 
such as polyethylene. This partitioning at the AWI may also explain the differential 
susceptibility of individual members of the Coronaviridae to inactivation on surfaces. 
The major coronavirus surface protein is the spike protein, which plays a vital role in 
viral entry into the cell (Bosch et al., 2003). Comparative studies of the spike protein 
structure of coronaviruses have found differences in the amino acid sequence in portions 
of the spike proteins of MHV and 229E (Bosch et al., 2003). These amino acid sequence 
variations may lead to structural variations that cause different coronaviruses to partition 
differently at the AWI, causing some coronaviruses to be inactivated more quickly or to a 
greater extent by forces at the interface than others. Previous investigators have found 
that the effect of humidity on viral survival on surfaces can differ for structurally similar 
viruses belonging to the same family (Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991), and these 
small structural variations in important viral proteins may partially explain why the 
relationship between RH and survival on surfaces differs even among closely related 
viruses. 
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Other investigators have suggested that viral inactivation during the desiccation step is 
an important determinant of survival of viruses on surfaces (Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 
1994). During desiccation, the loss of water molecules from a viral suspension on a 
surface triggers several processes that lead to viral inactivation. Lipid membranes 
undergo phase changes as water molecules are lost, destroying their native structures. As 
lipid membranes undergo phase changes, the proteins associated with these membranes 
may also undergo changes. Protein groups brought into contact by changes in the shape 
of the lipid membrane may undergo cross-linking reactions and changes in tertiary 
protein structures. Proteins and nucleic acids can crosslink, both with other like 
molecules and with each other (Cox, 1992). These changes in lipid and protein structures 
could be the mechanism by which enveloped viruses are inactivated as they become 
desiccated on surfaces. During desiccation, amino acids in viral proteins can also undergo 
Maillard reactions as water molecules are lost, resulting in structural changes. Lipids that 
are oxidized during the desiccation process also form peroxides and hydroperoxides, 
which can also participate in Maillard reactions, driving further protein damage (Cox, 
1992).  
As discussed above, mechanisms of virus inactivation on surfaces may involve both 
desiccation and interaction at the AWI, with the contribution of each depending on the 
RH level. At low RH, desiccation is relatively rapid, and viruses may have little time to 
diffuse toward the AWI and undergo inactivation there. At low RH, oxidation and 
Maillard reactions occurring during desiccation may be the predominant mechanisms of 
inactivation, with little opportunity for inactivation at the AWI because water is lost 
quickly (complete drying at 20% RH in these studies was observed in ~3 hours). If 
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relative humidity levels are high (80%), the rate of loss of water molecules may be very 
slow (drying times in these studies at 80% RH were >6 hours). During the time the virus 
remains in liquid suspension, the main mechanism may be inactivation taking place at the 
AWI, rather than inactivation by desiccation effects The altter mechanism  may 
predominate later when most of the liquid has evaporated away. In addition, at high RH, 
the hydrophobicity of the AWI is decreased (Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991). 
This may have protective effects, possibly decreasing the partitioning of viruses at the 
AWI and slowing viral inactivation. However, when RH is around 50%, where liquid 
suspension evaporates slowly over a period of hours (4-5 in these studies), then these two 
mechanisms of inactivation- inactivation at the AWI and inactivation by desiccation- may 
be operating simultaneously. At moderate RH, lower numbers of water molecules in the 
air may increase the hydrophobicity of the AWI compared to high RH, increasing viral 
partitioning at the interface and resulting in increasing rates of viral inactivation. Because 
the AWI persists for a long period during slow desiccation, viruses in the suspension 
have more opportunities to diffuse toward this more hydrophobic AWI. Also, as water 
molecules are lost during desiccation, two processes can be taking place. First, there is 
the lipid oxidation and Maillard reactions from desiccation itself, with maximum rates of 
Maillard reactions occur when RH levels are 50-80% (Cox, 1992). Second, more viruses 
in various layers of the viral suspension may be exposed to the AWI as water molecules 
are progressively lost from the droplet of virus suspension. Both of these processes last 
longer than they would at low RH, possibly resulting in greater viral inactivation. This 
may serve as a partial explanation for why viral inactivation appears to be more rapid at 
50% RH than at 20% or 80%.  
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There may also be mechanisms of inactivation that are specific to the structural 
features of the coronaviruses. The coronavirus spike protein, the main viral surface 
protein, contains a cysteine rich domain in the transmembrane anchor, which is necessary 
for viral fusion with cells (Chang et al., 2000). Cysteine residues contain sulfur groups, 
which form disulfide bridges when oxidized. Disulfide bridge formation irreversibly 
alters the structure of the protein. It may be that oxidation caused by free radicals 
resulting from the breakdown of the lipid viral envelope (Cox, 1992) results in the 
formation of disulfide bridges in the transmembrane domain, irreversibly altering a 
section of the protein necessary for viral fusion with host cells.  
The results of this study show that coronaviruses can survive on surfaces anywhere 
from hours to weeks, depending on the temperature and relative humidity levels. At 
ambient temperatures around 20°C, these viruses can survive for 2 days while losing only 
1-2 log10 infectivity, depending on the humidity level. Therefore, if deposited in high 
numbers, they can potentially survive on surfaces in healthcare environments for days. If 
these viruses contaminate items of PPE in high numbers, they may survive for the length 
of time that PPE is worn (typically <1hr) in numbers high enough to pose a risk of viral 
transmission if people come in contact with contaminated PPE. This could pose a serious 
human health risk should SARS-CoV ever re-emerge. Evidence of SARS-CoV 
contamination of hospital surfaces was been found during the SARS outbreak.  Sampling 
of surfaces in hospitals during the outbreak, including surfaces in patient rooms and areas 
on floors used for isolation of SARS patients, found SARS-CoV nucleic acids on surfaces 
and inanimate objects in patient rooms, nurses’ stations, and public areas of the hospital 
(Booth et al., 2005; Dowell et al, 2004). Infectious virus was not cultured from any of the 
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samples, so it is unclear whether the presence of viral nucleic acids  indicates that 
infectious SARS-CoV is present on hospital surfaces in outbreak settings. The presence 
of nucleic acids, however, suggests the possibility that infectious virus was present on 
these surfaces for a period of time, and these surfaces could become sources of further 
viral transmission. If these surfaces become contaminated by body fluids from SARS 
patients during illness, these fluids could potentially deposit SARS-CoV in high numbers. 
There have been several studies quantifying the viral load in body fluids from SARS 
patients. Wong et al. (2005) examined nasopharyngeal swabs of SARS patients and 
found that viral load ranged from 104 to 107 RNA copies/mL; Cheng et al. (2004) found 
that viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates peaked around day 12-14 of infection, at 105 
copies/mL. Their findings are similar to those of Hung et al. (2004), who found that mean 
viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates around day 10–15 of infection was 105 copies/mL. 
Peiris et al. (2003) found that peak viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates around day 10 
of infection ranged from 106 to 108 copies/mL. Together, these findings suggest that 
respiratory secretions from SARS patients may contain high numbers of viruses, which 
could potentially result in deposition of high numbers of viruses on hospital surfaces or 
healthcare workers’ PPE. If this happens, these viruses could remain infectious on 
surfaces long enough for other people to come in contact with them, posing a risk for 
disease transmission. The results of this study suggest that TGEV and MHV could serve 
as conservative surrogates for modeling the risk of SARS-CoV presence and persistence 
on environmental surfaces to pose a risk of exposure and transmission via healthcare 
surfaces and PPE items.  These viruses may be useful models in studies to determine 
ways to interrupt this route of SARS-CoV disease transmission. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
The results of these studies demonstrate that members of the Coronaviridae can 
survive and remain infectious for long periods of time in water, on surfaces, and on 
fomites, including personal protective equipment designed to interrupt the transmission 
of viruses to healthcare workers. These environmental media play roles in several 
potential pathways for virus transmission. These include: 
• Inhalation of droplets and aerosols from virus-contaminated water 
• Deposition of viruses on surfaces when virus-containing droplets and aerosols settle 
out of the air or are removed other loss mechanisms (impaction, electrostatic  
deposition, etc.) 
• Acquisition of infectious virus from direct contact with virus-contaminated surfaces  
• Acquisition of infectious viruses from PPE when PPE items are handled during 
removal 
Methods for virus recovery and the data on virus survival from these studies can be 
used to more accurately model and assess the risks of coronavirus transmission via 
surfaces and fomites in healthcare environments. 
Examination of the kinetics of coronavirus survival in water provides some insights 
into the persistence of coronaviruses in different environmental media. These studies 
demonstrated that TGEV and MHV can survive and remain infectious for long periods in 
different water types ranging from highly treated water, to surface water to sewage at 
both low (4oC) and at typical temperate  ambient (25°C) temperatures. In all water types, 
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the titer of infectious virus declined more rapidly at 25°C than at 4°C.  At 4oC, infectious 
virus titers declined only slowly and either by low to moderate levels (up to 2 log10 at 14 
days) or not at all.  In reagent-grade water at 25°C, infectious virus titers declined more 
rapidly than at 4oC, with the extent of reduction differing with water quality. At 25°C the 
infectivity of TGEV in reagent grade water declined by approximately 0.6 log10 per week, 
vs. 1.5 log10 per week in pasteurized settled sewage. MHV in reagent grade water at 25°C 
declined by approximately 0.8 log10 per week,  vs. 2 log10 per week in pasteurized settled 
sewage. Temperature and incubation time were significant predictors of viral reduction, 
which is consistent with previous studies of viral survival in water (Yates, Gerba, and 
Kelley, 1985; Enriquez, Hurst, and Gerba, 1995). Water type was a significant predictor 
of the rate of viral reduction, with greater reduction seen in pasteurized settled sewage as 
compared to reagent grade water. There are several factors that could contribute to 
greater reduction in more contaminated water, including high molecular weight dissolved 
matter (Noble, and Fuhrman, 1997), particulate matter (possibly due to irreversible viral 
binding to particles) (Suttle and Chen, 1992), chemical constituents with antiviral activity, 
and bacteria which feed on the viral constituents such as proteins, producing metabolites 
that are toxic to viruses, and releasing proteolytic enzymes that damage virus structures 
(Deng and Cliver, 1992; Deng and Cliver, 1995; Herrmann et al., 1974).  
Long-term coronavirus survival in water has implications for human health. It has 
been established with other human pathogens that formation of droplets and aerosols 
from water contaminated with microorganisms can serve as a vehicle for transmission of 
both respiratory and enteric infections. The unique Amoy Gardens SARS outbreak, 
where a combination of factors resulted in aqueous droplets of fecally shed virus being 
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drawn from the plumbing system into living spaces and inhaled by building occupants, 
demonstrated that water aerosols have the potential to spread coronavirus infection 
(McKinney et al., 2006; WHO, 2003). This airborne route of exposure to waterborne 
pathogens has been recognized with other infectious diseases.  Epidemiologic studies 
have found heightened disease risks among people in communities exposed to sprinkler 
irrigation using wastewater (Fattal et al., 1986), including risks of clinical influenza and 
infectious hepatitis (Katzenelson, Buium, and Shuval, 1976). However, some of the 
evidence on the infectious disease risks from this roure of transmission is conflicting. 
Other studies have found no differences in disease rates from exposure to spray-irrigated 
wastewater (Shuval, Yekutiel, and Fattal, 1989).  
The available evidence suggests that a potential human health risk from exposure to 
water droplets and aerosols contaminated with viruses, including coronaviruses, exists, 
but the extent of this risk is unclear. It may be possible that if SARS-CoV-contaminated 
water or sewage becomes aerosolized, it could potentially transmit virus to large groups 
of people, even those who have never come in contact with an infected individual. The 
persistence of coronaviruses in water and sewage suggests that quarantine measures, 
which proved effective in containing the last SARS outbreak, could be undermined if the 
risk of contaminated water is not considered. However, the magnitude of that risk is still 
unclear, and survival in water is only one piece of evidence required to assess this 
category of risk. The risks should be further explored using data on virus survival in 
droplets and aerosols, exposure data linked to measured health effects from 
epidemiological studies and risk assessment modeling. Data on the survival of 
coronaviruses in water as well as in airborne droplets and aerosols can be used in these 
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risk assessment models to more accurately quantify risks posed by the water droplet or 
aerosol pathways and design strategies to control them. 
The risk posed by viruses in airborne droplet and aerosols is not limited to inhalation 
of these droplets or aerosols. Coronaviruses can survive for hours in aerosolized states 
(Ijaz et al., 1985), and the fate of these aerosols in the environment has implications for 
infection control. As droplets and aerosols settle, they can land on environmental surfaces. 
The deposition of these particles on surfaces could pose a risk of infection to people who 
come in contact with contaminated surfaces. Studies have shown that people transfer 
viruses from surface to hands and hands to surfaces when touching contaminated surfaces, 
and that these surfaces can transmit infection (Ansari et al., 1991; Ansari et al., 1998; 
Gwaltney and Hendley, 1982; Mbithi et al., 1992; Rusin, Maxwell, and Gerba, 2002; 
Sattar et al., 1993). 
The results of these studies show that members of the coronavirus family have the 
potential to remain infectious for hours to days when dried onto environmental surfaces, 
with important implications for these surface-to-hand and hand-to-surface transmission 
pathways. The magnitude of the risk from these transmission pathways is influenced by 
environmental conditions which affect viral survival. As found in water, temperature is 
an important factor in virus survival; low temperatures reduce the rates of viral 
inactivation on surfaces just as they do in water. The rate of viral inactivation is also 
dependent on the relative humidity level of the environment, with high (80%) and low 
(20%) RH being more favorable to virus survival than moderate (50%) RH. If deposited 
in high numbers, coronaviruses dried onto surfaces may survive for days at temperatures 
and humidity levels found in healthcare environments. In these experiments, the 
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relationship between virus inactivation on surfaces and relative humidity level was not 
straightforward, which is consistent with observations made by other investigators of 
survival kinetics of other viruses dried on surfaces. Results from this study suggest a 
roughly U-shaped relationship in which, compared to moderate (50%) RH, high RH has a 
protective effect for viruses dried onto surfaces, but lower humidity levels may also have 
this effect. Conflicting results in previous literature suggest the relationship between 
humidity and virus inactivation is still not entirely clear, and may differ by virus type 
(Abad, Pinto, and Bosch, 1994; Mbithi, Springthorpe, and Sattar, 1991). Much of the 
previous work done has been with non-enveloped viruses, and the results may not be 
directly applicable to predicting the survival of enveloped viruses on surfaces. The 
coronavirus data presented here, as well as previous findings with non-enveloped viruses, 
suggest that rates of viral inactivation are slower at lower temperatures, but effects of 
relative humidity on viral survival at varying temperatures are differential, with often 
greater survival at RH extremes than at 50% RH.  
The data from this study offer some insight into the comparative survival of different 
coronaviruses on surfaces. TGEV and MHV dried onto surfaces at ambient temperatures 
appear to be much more resistant to inactivation than is human coronavirus 229E. It is 
difficult to determine from existing data whether TGEV and MHV are more or less 
resistant to inactivation on surfaces than SARS CoV. This is because there are currently 
only limited data on the survival of SARS-CoV on surfaces. Rabenau et al. (2005) 
reported SARS-CoV exhibited a reduction of 4 log10 after 9 days on a polystyrene surface. 
In that study it was not reported whether temperature and humidity conditions were 
controlled and at what levels. This extent of SARS-CoV inactivation is consistent with 
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observations of inactivation rates for TGEV and MHV at 20°C and 50% RH in this study. 
This consistency in virus inactivation rates suggests that TGEV and MHV may be 
suitable models for survival and inactivation of SARS-CoV on surfaces.  In contrast, 
229E appears to be inactivated much more quickly than SARS-CoV and therefore is 
inadequate to model SARS-CoV survival. However, more data are needed on the 
inactivation rates of SARS-CoV itself before these relationships can be definitively 
established.  
The mechanisms of inactivation of viruses on surfaces have not been completely 
elucidated, but several possible mechanisms exist. Some are specific to the structure of 
coronaviruses, and some are generally applicable to all virus types. They include: 
• Inactivation at the air-water interface (AWI) of a solution, due to hydrophobic regions 
of the virus structure partitioning out of solution and hydrophilic regions remain in 
solution (Thompson et al., 1998) 
• Affinity of the lipid envelopes on the surfaces of coronaviruses for the AWI, resulting 
in greater inactivation at the interface compared to non-enveloped viruses 
• Partitioning of the coronavirus spike protein, which has both hydrophobic and polar 
regions (Bosch et al., 2003l; Spiga et al., 2003), at the AWI, leading to viral 
inactivation 
• Inactivation by viruses partitioning at the triple-phase-boundary (TPB) where liquid, 
air, and a hydrophobic surface meet 
• Amino acid sequence variations in portions of the spike proteins of individual 
members of the Coronaviridae, causing different species of coronaviruses to partition 
differently at the AWI, and causing some coronaviruses to be inactivated more 
quickly than others by forces at the interface  
• Loss of water molecules from a viral suspension on a surface during desiccation  
• Phase changes in lipid membranes during desiccation, destroying their native 
structures 
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• Cross-linking reactions and changes in tertiary protein structures for protein groups 
brought into contact by changes in the shape of the lipid membrane during 
desiccation  
• Viral proteins undergoing Maillard reactions as water molecules are lost, resulting in 
structural changes 
• Oxidation of lipids during the desiccation process to form peroxides and 
hydroperoxides, which can also participate in Maillard reactions, driving further 
protein damage (Cox, 1992) 
• Desiccation-induced oxidation resulting in the formation of disulfide bridges in the 
transmembrane domain of the coronavirus spike protein, irreversibly altering the 
structure of the protein 
On surfaces, mechanisms of virus inactivation may involve both desiccation and 
interaction at the AWI, with the contribution of each depending on the RH level. These 
data show that coronaviruses can survive on surfaces anywhere from hours to weeks, 
depending on the temperature and relative humidity levels. Times required for 99% 
inactivation ranged from 3-5 days at 20°C and high humidity, to weeks at 4°C and low 
humidity. If deposited in high numbers, infectious coronaviruses and other viruses can 
potentially survive for days on surfaces in healthcare environments, such as tables, 
bedrails, doorknobs, faucets, desks, phones, countertops, computer keyboards and 
mouses, and medical equipment (Boone and Gerba, 2007). As with contaminated 
aerosols, contaminated surfaces could continue to serve as sources of transmission for 
viruses such as SARS-CoV after infected individuals are no longer present in the 
contaminated environment. 
The survival of coronaviruses on surfaces also has important implications for 
transmission via contaminated fomites in healthcare environments, particularly items of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) used by HCWs. These studies show that TGEV and 
 126 
MHV deposited in high numbers (104-105 MPN) survive on different non-porous and 
porous materials of healthcare personal protective equipment. Studies quantifying the 
viral load in body fluids from SARS patients estimate viral load in respiratory secretions 
ranging from 104 to 108 units (gene copies)/mL depending on the stage of infection. If 
secretions containing these levels of viral load contaminate items of PPE, some viruses 
may survive for the length of time that PPE is worn during patient care activities 
(typically <1 hr) in numbers high enough to pose a risk of viral transmission when PPE is 
handled during removal. This could pose a serious human health risk should SARS-CoV 
ever re-emerge.  
There are still knowledge gaps in assessing the risk of viral disease transmission posed 
by handling contaminated PPE. Accurate measurement of levels of viral contamination 
and the length of viral survival on PPE items is vital to accurately asses these risks, and 
studies of viral loads and survival on PPE items require quantitative and efficient 
methods for recovering viruses from PPE. To date, there have been few studies assessing 
the survival of pathogens on materials used to make personal protective equipment (Yassi 
et al., 2005). The existing literature on viral survival on PPE encompasses only some 
materials, and studies use a variety of methods to recover viruses from test materials, 
making comparisons between studies difficult. Different methods for viral recovery may 
have different recovery efficiencies, especially if not specifically tailored for the recovery 
of viruses. 
This study demonstrated that a protein-based eluent, beef extract, is effective for 
eluting viruses from a range of PPE materials, possibly due to the disruption of both 
charged and hydrophobic interactions between the virus and the PPE surface. Beef 
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extract may also be efficacious for the elution of other types of viruses from PPE, 
including enveloped viruses, but further research in this area is needed. The recovery 
methods developed in these studies using a model virus (MS2) can be used to expand our 
knowledge of how PPE becomes contaminated by viruses, how long these viruses survive 
on contaminated PPE, and the extent to which these viruses can be transferred to other 
people and pose health risks.  
These studies of TGEV and MHV on PPE materials suggest that coronaviruses have 
the potential to survive on such materials for periods longer than single-use PPE is 
usually worn, creating the potential for viral transfer when PPE is handled after wearing. 
Removing PPE after patient care without contaminating skin or clothes is important for 
reducing HCWs’ infection risk. If patients shed viruses onto healthcare workers’ PPE in 
the course of patient care, these viruses can remain infectious when PPE is removed. 
Transfer of viruses from experimentally contaminated fabrics (Rusin, Maxwell, and 
Gerba, 2002), plastic surfaces (Gwaltney and Hendley, 1982), and gloves (Hall, Douglas, 
and Geiman, 1980) to hands has been demonstrated, suggesting that viruses can transfer 
from PPE to hands when contaminated items are handled in the course of removal and 
disposal. In addition, contamination can be present on skin after exposure to pathogens 
even when PPE is worn (Zamora et al., 2006), and may be transferred to used items of 
PPE if they are handled after removal. Virus transfer between hands and PPE items can 
encourage both accidental autoinoculation by the healthcare worker and subsequent 
transmission of viruses to other patients, staff, or family members, especially when 
inadequate hand hygiene is practiced (Pittet et al., 2006).  
 128 
Given that PPE may be contaminated with infectious virus when it is removed after 
patient care, developing and validating an algorithm and protocol for the removal of PPE 
that prevents contamination of the skin and clothes of HCWs is key to interrupting 
nosocomial transmission of potentially serious infectious diseases, including SARS, 
avian influenza, viral hemorrhagic fevers and poxvirus diseases (e.g., monkey pox). The 
human volunteer experiments carried out using MS2 and the current CDC algorithm and 
protocol for PPE removal demonstrate viral transfer from PPE to skin and clothes during 
PPE removal. These results demonstrate that the current CDC algorithm/protocol is 
insufficient to protect HCWs from contamination during PPE removal. However, several 
potential options exist to that might prevent or further reduce such contamination, 
including double gloving, use of surgical protocols for PPE removal, and use of PPE 
impregnated with antimicrobial agents.  
The first two options ensure that PPE is not handled with ungloved hands. A double 
glove removal sequence would begin with removal of the outer glove, followed by 
goggles or face shield, gown, and respirator/mask, and finishing with removal of the 
inner glove followed by hand hygiene. Using this method, handling of PPE with 
ungloved hands is avoided. The use of an inner glove ½ size larger than usually worn 
may be used to improve dexterity and reduce constriction when double gloving. 
Borrowing PPE protocols from surgery, where the ends of gown sleeves are tucked 
underneath gloves during wear, might also reduce contamination. When finished, goggles 
and respirator are removed first, and gown and gloves are then removed together by 
peeling off both at the same time, again avoiding handling PPE with ungloved hands. Use 
of PPE impregnated with antimicrobial agents may be able to reduce contamination 
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without the need for behavior change. Further research is needed to determine what 
antiviral agents would be effective when incorporated into or applied to PPE without 
posing unacceptable toxicity risks to users or their contacts. 
This study also indicates the need for continued emphasis on hand hygiene. A barrier 
to improving hand hygiene compliance rates is the belief that gloves make hand hygiene 
unnecessary (Pittet et al., 2001). This belief is contradicted by our study and others 
showing that organisms can spread from gloves to hands after glove removal (Doebbeling 
et al., 1988). Even if double gloving is incorporated into protocols for PPE use, it is vital 
to emphasize that this procedure is not a substitute for proper hand hygiene. Before these 
or other candidate methods are introduced into clinical practice, their impact on the safety 
of HCWs should be validated by testing using methods such as those developed and 
applied in these studies.   
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Conclusions 
• TGEV and MHV can survive and remain infectious for long periods in different 
water types including highly treated water, surface water, and sewage 
• TGEV and MHV can survive and remain infectious at both low (4°C) and at typical 
temperate ambient (25°C) temperatures. Estimated times for 99% infectious virus 
reduction (1% initial virus survival) ranged from 49 to >365 days at 4°C and  from 7 
to 22 days at 25°C, depending on water quality 
• In all water types, the titer of infectious virus declined more rapidly at 25°C than at 
4°C.   
• Water type, incubation time, and temperature were significant predictors of log10 viral 
reduction kinetics.  
• TGEV and MHV may serve as conservative indicators of the survival of SARS-CoV 
in water and sewage.  
• The observed survival of coronaviruses at low and moderate temperatures in highly 
treated potable waters has important exposure risk implications for its spread via 
fecally contaminated water as droplets or aerosols, should it re-emerge in human 
populations.   
• A protein-based eluent, beef extract, is effective for efficiently eluting viruses from a 
range of PPE materials, possibly due to the disruption of both charged and 
hydrophobic interactions between the virus and the surface. 
• Elution with 1.5% beef extract pH 7.5 followed by two-step enrichment assay can 
efficiently recover infectious MS2 from contaminated PPE that has been worn during 
the performance of a healthcare task 
• The methods developed for elution and assay of infectious MS2 from PPE can be 
used to conduct further quantitative and rigorous studies of viral survival on PPE 
using model viruses, in order to produce data that can be used for risk assessments in 
infection control and healthcare worker protection. 
• The results of this study document viral transfer from PPE to other PPE sites and to 
skin. 
 131 
• Such virus transfer demonstrates that the current CDC algorithm and protocol is 
insufficient to protect HCWs from contamination during PPE removal  
• Developing and validating an algorithm or protocol for the removal of PPE that 
prevents contamination of the skin and clothes of HCWs is needed because it is a key 
measure to interrupt nosocomial transmission of viruses like SARS-CoV to HCWs 
• Several potential options exist that might prevent or reduce the risks of such 
contamination, including double gloving, use of surgical protocols for PPE removal, 
and PPE impregnated with an antimicrobial agent  
• These potential alternative methods for PPE removal should be validated by testing 
using analytical methods such as those described for the human volunteer studies 
done using the CDC algorithm and protocol 
• If deposited in high numbers, coronaviruses dried onto surfaces may survive for days 
at temperatures and humidity levels found in healthcare environments, with times for 
99% reduction (1% virus survival) at 20°C and 50% RH approximately 2 days for 
TGEV and 3 days for MHV 
• Overall, virus survival was enhanced by low temperatures; the relationship between 
temperature and inactivation rate was 4°C>20°C>40°C. 
• In these experiments, the relationship between virus inactivation on surfaces and 
relative humidity level was not linearly correlated, which is consistent with 
observations made by other investigators of non-enveloped viruses dried on surfaces 
• Results from this study suggest a roughly U-shaped relationship between virus 
survival and RH; compared to moderate (50%) RH, high (80%) RH has a protective 
effect for viruses dried onto surfaces, but lower RH (20%) may also have this 
protective effect 
• Inactivation rates for TGEV and MHV at 20°C and 50% RH in this study are 
consistent with previous observations of SARS-CoV survival on a polystyrene 
surface, suggesting that TGEV and MHV may be suitable models for survival and 
inactivation of SARS-CoV on surfaces.  In contrast, human coronavirus 229E may be 
inactivated much more quickly than SARS-CoV 
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• TGEV and MHV deposited in high numbers (104-105 MPN) survive on materials used 
to make PPE, with survival of 1% of initial viruses after 2 to 24 hours.   
• Virus inactivation occurs more quickly on ceramic, laminate, plastic, and PPE 
materials than on stainless steel surfaces. 
• Viral inactivation on surfaces may be due to a complex of mechanisms that include 
temperature-dependent inactivation, desiccation, effects of the air-water interface, and 
oxidation 
• The results of this study suggest that TGEV and MHV could serve as conservative 
surrogates for modeling the risk of indirect personal contact and environmental 
transmission of SARS-CoV by healthcare surfaces and PPE items, and can be used in 
studies to determine ways to interrupt this route of exposure posing a risk of disease 
transmission 
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Future research 
In order to choose a surrogate virus that accurately models the survival of SARS-CoV 
in the environment, the results of these studies using bacteriophage MS2 on PPE and the 
animal coronaviruses TGEV and MHV in water and on environmental surfaces need to 
be compared to those from SARS-CoV survival and transfer studies. More also needs to 
be done to understand the mechanisms of viral inactivation on surfaces at different 
temperature and humidity levels, and how these mechanisms contribute to differential 
survival of members of the Coronaviridae on surfaces. The use of GFP tagged viruses 
with confocal laser scanning microscopy might contribute to understanding of the 
partitioning behavior of viruses at the AWI and the effect of this partitioning on viral 
survival. 
There are several alternative protocols for removing PPE that might be able to reduce 
the risk of viral contamination of the wearer. These methods could be compared to each 
other in a single study, using a randomized controlled crossover design. Subjects would 
be randomized to different removal methods groups, with the CDC method serving as the 
control group. To assess the effect of the level of contamination, different amounts of 
virus could be used for the initial inoculum. These PPE removal protocols should also be 
tested using an enveloped virus as a model for SARS-CoV, such as an enveloped 
bacteriophage. The methods developed for elution of viruses from PPE would first need 
to be tested with an enveloped virus to ensure that recovery efficiency is comparable to 
that of MS2 or otherwise considered of acceptable magnitude. The randomized controlled 
crossover design could then be used to assess transfer of enveloped viruses from 
contaminated PPE and compare it to that of non-enveloped viruses. 
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The evidence presented here on coronavirus survival in water is only part of the 
evidence base needed to assess the risk of future coronavirus transmission via 
contaminated water and fecal droplets and aerosols. TGEV and MHV show potential as 
conservative surrogates for the survival of SARS-CoV both in water and on surfaces. 
Studies of the survival kinetics and fate of these viruses in aerosolized droplets of 
contaminated water could be used to assess the risk of future SARS transmission via 
these routes. 
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